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analysis: Costing our Afghanistan policy Najmuddin A Shaikh
We must recognise the nexus between criminal elements in the two countries. Smuggling of drugs and other goods has created a Pak-Afghan mafia whose interests are best served by instability in both countries, or at least in the belt in which they operate
What should be the nature of Pakistans interest in Afghanistan? Most people are prepared to concede that we wrongly used arguments such as strategic depth, the absolute necessity of having a friendly government in Kabul, and protection of the interests of Afghan Pashtuns etc., to pursue unrealistic ambitious policies that have led to the current sorry state of bilateral relations. It has created a critical situation, especially in the tribal belt.
Our interest, if we define it correctly, is a stable Afghanistan, which does not have the desire or the capacity to foment trouble in Pakistan; provides a market for Pakistani goods in legitimate trade; is not a source of narcotics; provides a transit route for trade between South and Central Asia; and which may continue to raise the Durand Line issue for domestic reasons but does not allow this to affect bilateral ties in other spheres.
We need to assure the Afghans that we respect their independence and sovereignty, and that we have no ambitions to influence the political set-up in Kabul or dictate the nature of its relationship with the rest of the world so long as this does not impinge on Pakistans security. Further, we need to assure them that we will continue to provide transit facilities for Afghanistans trade with the rest of the world, and most importantly, that we will take all measures to prevent the use of our territory for attacks on Afghanistan.
The costs of our Afghanistan policy have never been computed honestly. Admittedly, a great deal of damage was done during the Afghan Jihad, which we had supported for our own security. Better controls could have reduced the cost to Pakistan but our flawed policies led to the rise of the Kalashnikov and drug culture and the breakdown of law and order that continued even after Soviet withdrawal, multiplying after the rise of the Taliban in 1995-96.
Today, we have far more Afghan refugees than the 2.5 million acknowledged. 35 percent of Afghanistans opium transits through Pakistan with perhaps half that remaining in Pakistan, creating more domestic addicts. Goods worth around $5 billion from all over the world are smuggled into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Vast quantities of wheat are being smuggled from Pakistan into Afghanistan as Pakistan imports wheat at much higher prices to meet the consequent shortages. Some, if not all, of these costs would be reduced with adjustments to our Afghanistan policy.
As I stated in my last column, the situation in Afghanistan is not likely to improve in the near future. What we do in the tribal areas and in combating extremism within Pakistans borders will have an impact in Afghanistan, but it will not be decisive. We have to do it nevertheless for our own survival as a moderate, tolerant state. We must also help combat terror in Afghanistan, as it is in our own interest.
For an Afghanistan that does not have the capacity to foment trouble, there needs to be a drastic improvement in the situation. Afghanistans army, largely officered by Tajiks, will increase to 134,000 with coalition support. The coalition will have to continue to support them financially as the costs of such an army will far exceed Afghanistans total annual revenues.
This would be an unwelcome development for Pakistans security. Further, it would also ensure that Afghanistan remains unstable and unable to provide safe transit routes or the good governance needed to curb illegitimate trade.
The development of a new relationship will take time and may face many setbacks. We must accept that over the past three decades, feelings towards Pakistan, especially in the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan, are not friendly. The Pashtuns attribute many of their problems to cross-border infiltration.
Moreover, we find the most vehement opponents of the proposal of recognition of the Durand Line as the border in the Pashtun belt. There is also opposition to the replacement of the current practice of allowing free movement across the border with normal documentation requirements.
We must recognise the nexus between criminal elements in the two countries. Smuggling of drugs and other goods has created a Pak-Afghan mafia whose interests are best served by instability in both countries, or at least in the belt in which they operate. These elements terrorise the local population as much as the Taliban, and like the Taliban, offer employment opportunities in sorely underdeveloped regions.
Taliban participation in the government of Afghanistan, in the unlikely event that this does materialise from recent talks of reconciliation, may bring a measure of stability to the country, and is therefore to be welcomed. But it would mean that we would need to be extra cautious over cross-border movement.
The Taliban are no longer (if they ever were) a nationalist movement intent on establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan alone. At the very least they will want the benefits of an Islamic government to be available to their Pashtun brethren across a border they do not recognise. What this could mean for us is apparent from the transformation of the initial demand for sharia in Malakand and the observance of Islamic codes in the tribal areas into far more ambitious plans for the whole of Pakistan.
Apart from formulating and implementing a new Afghanistan policy, the first step we need to take is to assure the people of the region that we are not going to draw a distinction between the foreign militants and the Afghan/Pakistani Taliban in the process of eliminating terrorism. We will, however, be prepared to work on settling local grievances with our Taliban who are prepared to renounce violence.
The people must not feel that there are Taliban that are perceived as friendly and therefore are beyond the power of the local authorities. They must also be sure that local officials have no ambivalence about the implementation of the new policy. The trust of the local people must be won, and they must be provided protection from Taliban intimidation and predatory raids. They must also be assured that any militant training camps that they identify will be eliminated.
Parliamentary debate must have no ground for statements like There are still training camps, still [terrorist] sanctuaries, still cross-border movement in the tribal area...there is duplicity, at some level, in our policies. (Bushra Gohar, senior vice president, ANP) The credibility of the governments commitment to the campaign must be unquestionable, as must be the protection and assistance that is offered to those prepared to take on the Taliban.
While the army is battling insurgents in Bajaur, local authorities with the assistance of the army should locate and deport the 55,000 illegal Afghan refugees we have belatedly acknowledged to be in the area. Similar exercises will be needed in the other agencies and in Balochistan.
Similarly, the priorities of the notables and elders of this populace must be respected in determining the economic development of the area, the prong we talk about most but one that seems to be showing least results on the ground.
One focus of our diplomatic effort has to be ensuring that feasible, if modest, development plans owned by the local populace are presented to donor countries for the funding needed to supplement our national effort.
Perhaps we can ask each tribal elder to nominate youths who can locally, or in the settled areas, be given vocational training and be paid a stipend, start work-for-food programmes in areas where feasible, with programmes following in troubled areas once they are cleared of miscreants.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
We must recognise the nexus between criminal elements in the two countries. Smuggling of drugs and other goods has created a Pak-Afghan mafia whose interests are best served by instability in both countries, or at least in the belt in which they operate
What should be the nature of Pakistans interest in Afghanistan? Most people are prepared to concede that we wrongly used arguments such as strategic depth, the absolute necessity of having a friendly government in Kabul, and protection of the interests of Afghan Pashtuns etc., to pursue unrealistic ambitious policies that have led to the current sorry state of bilateral relations. It has created a critical situation, especially in the tribal belt.
Our interest, if we define it correctly, is a stable Afghanistan, which does not have the desire or the capacity to foment trouble in Pakistan; provides a market for Pakistani goods in legitimate trade; is not a source of narcotics; provides a transit route for trade between South and Central Asia; and which may continue to raise the Durand Line issue for domestic reasons but does not allow this to affect bilateral ties in other spheres.
We need to assure the Afghans that we respect their independence and sovereignty, and that we have no ambitions to influence the political set-up in Kabul or dictate the nature of its relationship with the rest of the world so long as this does not impinge on Pakistans security. Further, we need to assure them that we will continue to provide transit facilities for Afghanistans trade with the rest of the world, and most importantly, that we will take all measures to prevent the use of our territory for attacks on Afghanistan.
The costs of our Afghanistan policy have never been computed honestly. Admittedly, a great deal of damage was done during the Afghan Jihad, which we had supported for our own security. Better controls could have reduced the cost to Pakistan but our flawed policies led to the rise of the Kalashnikov and drug culture and the breakdown of law and order that continued even after Soviet withdrawal, multiplying after the rise of the Taliban in 1995-96.
Today, we have far more Afghan refugees than the 2.5 million acknowledged. 35 percent of Afghanistans opium transits through Pakistan with perhaps half that remaining in Pakistan, creating more domestic addicts. Goods worth around $5 billion from all over the world are smuggled into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Vast quantities of wheat are being smuggled from Pakistan into Afghanistan as Pakistan imports wheat at much higher prices to meet the consequent shortages. Some, if not all, of these costs would be reduced with adjustments to our Afghanistan policy.
As I stated in my last column, the situation in Afghanistan is not likely to improve in the near future. What we do in the tribal areas and in combating extremism within Pakistans borders will have an impact in Afghanistan, but it will not be decisive. We have to do it nevertheless for our own survival as a moderate, tolerant state. We must also help combat terror in Afghanistan, as it is in our own interest.
For an Afghanistan that does not have the capacity to foment trouble, there needs to be a drastic improvement in the situation. Afghanistans army, largely officered by Tajiks, will increase to 134,000 with coalition support. The coalition will have to continue to support them financially as the costs of such an army will far exceed Afghanistans total annual revenues.
This would be an unwelcome development for Pakistans security. Further, it would also ensure that Afghanistan remains unstable and unable to provide safe transit routes or the good governance needed to curb illegitimate trade.
The development of a new relationship will take time and may face many setbacks. We must accept that over the past three decades, feelings towards Pakistan, especially in the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan, are not friendly. The Pashtuns attribute many of their problems to cross-border infiltration.
Moreover, we find the most vehement opponents of the proposal of recognition of the Durand Line as the border in the Pashtun belt. There is also opposition to the replacement of the current practice of allowing free movement across the border with normal documentation requirements.
We must recognise the nexus between criminal elements in the two countries. Smuggling of drugs and other goods has created a Pak-Afghan mafia whose interests are best served by instability in both countries, or at least in the belt in which they operate. These elements terrorise the local population as much as the Taliban, and like the Taliban, offer employment opportunities in sorely underdeveloped regions.
Taliban participation in the government of Afghanistan, in the unlikely event that this does materialise from recent talks of reconciliation, may bring a measure of stability to the country, and is therefore to be welcomed. But it would mean that we would need to be extra cautious over cross-border movement.
The Taliban are no longer (if they ever were) a nationalist movement intent on establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan alone. At the very least they will want the benefits of an Islamic government to be available to their Pashtun brethren across a border they do not recognise. What this could mean for us is apparent from the transformation of the initial demand for sharia in Malakand and the observance of Islamic codes in the tribal areas into far more ambitious plans for the whole of Pakistan.
Apart from formulating and implementing a new Afghanistan policy, the first step we need to take is to assure the people of the region that we are not going to draw a distinction between the foreign militants and the Afghan/Pakistani Taliban in the process of eliminating terrorism. We will, however, be prepared to work on settling local grievances with our Taliban who are prepared to renounce violence.
The people must not feel that there are Taliban that are perceived as friendly and therefore are beyond the power of the local authorities. They must also be sure that local officials have no ambivalence about the implementation of the new policy. The trust of the local people must be won, and they must be provided protection from Taliban intimidation and predatory raids. They must also be assured that any militant training camps that they identify will be eliminated.
Parliamentary debate must have no ground for statements like There are still training camps, still [terrorist] sanctuaries, still cross-border movement in the tribal area...there is duplicity, at some level, in our policies. (Bushra Gohar, senior vice president, ANP) The credibility of the governments commitment to the campaign must be unquestionable, as must be the protection and assistance that is offered to those prepared to take on the Taliban.
While the army is battling insurgents in Bajaur, local authorities with the assistance of the army should locate and deport the 55,000 illegal Afghan refugees we have belatedly acknowledged to be in the area. Similar exercises will be needed in the other agencies and in Balochistan.
Similarly, the priorities of the notables and elders of this populace must be respected in determining the economic development of the area, the prong we talk about most but one that seems to be showing least results on the ground.
One focus of our diplomatic effort has to be ensuring that feasible, if modest, development plans owned by the local populace are presented to donor countries for the funding needed to supplement our national effort.
Perhaps we can ask each tribal elder to nominate youths who can locally, or in the settled areas, be given vocational training and be paid a stipend, start work-for-food programmes in areas where feasible, with programmes following in troubled areas once they are cleared of miscreants.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
