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An ever weakening Afghan National Army
Global Village Space |
News Analysis |
As casualties mounted to dramatic levels in 2017, even according to official figures that are most likely underestimated, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has for the first time begun experiencing serious problems in recruitment. The army also experienced a resurgence of ghost soldiering (soldiers who are listed as being on active duty, but who do not serve)—a problem which had been largely contained by 2010. The units most exposed in the fighting were seriously depleted and under-strength.
The withdrawal of the mentors/advisers from the ANA tactical units in 2014 exposed a range of weaknesses in logistical capabilities, planning, procurement, equipment maintenance and administration. The resulting paradox is an ANA less mobile then the insurgents, despite the fact that it remains more or less in control of the main highways of the country. Despite the huge amounts of military hardware it has received, the ANA still mostly deploys to battle in unarmored Ford Rangers.
The tactical performance of the ANA in the midst of battle is more difficult to evaluate because reliable information is hard to come by, but sources within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the ANA themselves concur that there is a very serious leadership problem.
Read more: Afghanistan: From Soviet occupation to American ‘Liberation’
Appointments to senior positions are still heavily influenced by political interference, often resulting in the appointment of incompetent commanders. The insurgents have gained the initiative and the ANA has not been able to put together any serious efforts to reclaim it. As a result of all these factors, morale within the ANA is in decline. Reforming the ANA in the middle of an ongoing and escalating conflict is clearly a very difficult task, not least because of the political vetoes of factions, parties and powerful individuals.
ANA without mentors
Even at the MoD level the layer of advisers is a thin one, only permanently present at the top level of each department, with occasional visits paid to the next layer.
In 2014, all mentors and advisers were pulled out of ANA units. Resolute Support (RS)—the successor mission to ISAF and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan—only advises the senior leadership of the MoD and the ANA; it does not normally deploy any adviser below corps level. Even at the MoD level the layer of advisers is a thin one, only permanently present at the top level of each department, with occasional visits paid to the next layer. The ANA therefore fought through late 2014 and all of 2015 with almost no advisers within its ranks.
Read more: The power struggle in Afghanistan: Who will emerge victorious?
Equipment
The MoD and the ANA continue to demand heavier and more advanced equipment to confront the ongoing insurgency, as they have been doing for the last 16 years. Although their focus is on the need for a more capable air force and for more equipment of all types, they also complain of the insufficient preparation of artillerymen and the dramatic lack of mine detection equipment.
Read full article:
An ever weakening Afghan National Army
Global Village Space |
News Analysis |
As casualties mounted to dramatic levels in 2017, even according to official figures that are most likely underestimated, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has for the first time begun experiencing serious problems in recruitment. The army also experienced a resurgence of ghost soldiering (soldiers who are listed as being on active duty, but who do not serve)—a problem which had been largely contained by 2010. The units most exposed in the fighting were seriously depleted and under-strength.
The withdrawal of the mentors/advisers from the ANA tactical units in 2014 exposed a range of weaknesses in logistical capabilities, planning, procurement, equipment maintenance and administration. The resulting paradox is an ANA less mobile then the insurgents, despite the fact that it remains more or less in control of the main highways of the country. Despite the huge amounts of military hardware it has received, the ANA still mostly deploys to battle in unarmored Ford Rangers.
The tactical performance of the ANA in the midst of battle is more difficult to evaluate because reliable information is hard to come by, but sources within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the ANA themselves concur that there is a very serious leadership problem.
Read more: Afghanistan: From Soviet occupation to American ‘Liberation’
Appointments to senior positions are still heavily influenced by political interference, often resulting in the appointment of incompetent commanders. The insurgents have gained the initiative and the ANA has not been able to put together any serious efforts to reclaim it. As a result of all these factors, morale within the ANA is in decline. Reforming the ANA in the middle of an ongoing and escalating conflict is clearly a very difficult task, not least because of the political vetoes of factions, parties and powerful individuals.
ANA without mentors
Even at the MoD level the layer of advisers is a thin one, only permanently present at the top level of each department, with occasional visits paid to the next layer.
In 2014, all mentors and advisers were pulled out of ANA units. Resolute Support (RS)—the successor mission to ISAF and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan—only advises the senior leadership of the MoD and the ANA; it does not normally deploy any adviser below corps level. Even at the MoD level the layer of advisers is a thin one, only permanently present at the top level of each department, with occasional visits paid to the next layer. The ANA therefore fought through late 2014 and all of 2015 with almost no advisers within its ranks.
Read more: The power struggle in Afghanistan: Who will emerge victorious?
Equipment
The MoD and the ANA continue to demand heavier and more advanced equipment to confront the ongoing insurgency, as they have been doing for the last 16 years. Although their focus is on the need for a more capable air force and for more equipment of all types, they also complain of the insufficient preparation of artillerymen and the dramatic lack of mine detection equipment.
Read full article:
An ever weakening Afghan National Army
