AIR SUPERIORITY

[BLACKEAGLE]

TECHNOLOGY CHANGES the way battles are fought. The rarity of notable air battles
involving dogfights in the post–Vietnam War era can be attributed to the advances in airto-
air missile technology where longer range and better lock-in guidance have continuously
increased the engagement distance between aircrafts. The U.S. Air Force, for
example, has not had an ace (five aerial kills or more) since 1972. In many instances, the
battle is already decided on the radar long before visual contact is made. In recent confl icts
in the Middle East, air superiority was quickly established by the United States and allied
air forces, and the opposing fi ghters were mostly destroyed on the ground after their radar
and communication installations were knocked out in preemptive, stealth strikes or they
simply elected not to engage the U.S. fi ghters. The advances in technology, at least in
aerial battles, quickly made the prior-generation aircraft and armaments obsolete and resulted
in lopsided advantages for the side in possession of the superior technology. The
Israel-Syria confl ict back in 1982 and U.S.-Iraqi confl icts from 1991 onward have shown
that Russian-built MiG-29s and their equivalents were not of much threat to the F-15,
F-16, and other western counterparts. While it is true that a large part of the western superiority
also lies in the preparedness and training of the pilots, the training itself requires
many technological advances in fl ight simulators and battle scene reconstruction using
computers. More advanced Russian Sukhoi Su-30s and MiG-35s, on the other hand, are
viable weapons with potent sets of armaments and are making their way into the air forces
outside of Russia. The United States has in the meantime produced probably the most
advanced aircraft in history in the F-22 Raptor that embodies state-of-the-art technologies
in stealth, armaments, and battlefi eld management electronics. The more compact and
utility-oriented (less expensive) F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter” is also in the works.
To fi nd an example of aerial combats involving U.S. aircraft, one needs to look as far
back as 1989 in the Mediterranean region off the coast of northern Libya, a country in
North Africa next to Egypt. At the time, the Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qadhafi led
a rogue state of anti-American dictatorship. Using oil money, he had equipped his air force
with Russian-made jets including the MiG-23 Flogger. With the advent of long-range antiship
missiles and sophisticated air strike jet fighters, the U.S. aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy
operating in the area was on high alert. The tensions that existed between Libya and
the United States in preceding years, along with the unpredictable nature of Qadhafi , fueled
the prospect of an armed encounter in this region. A naval battle group, while carrying a
tremendous range and punch through its carrier-launched fi ghters (F-14 Tomcats), also is
vulnerable to missile and air attacks. For this reason, a battle group always moves with an
airborne early warning capability, in this case in the form of E-2C Hawkeye surveillance
aircraft. The long-range radar coverage of the E-2C allowed the intercept controller aboard

to detect two Libyan aircraft taking off from the Al-Bumbah air base more than 100 miles
deep in Libya and approaching the two F-14 Tomcats then on patrol in the air space above
the Gulf of Sidra off the Libyan coast. One of the patrol mission objectives was to protect
the air space near and above the carrier, and the F-14s took an air path to intercept the
bogeys from a rear, threat position. Instead of holding their course, the Libyan MiGs made
a counter move to circumvent the F-14s. Apparently the Libyan ground-based radars were
closely monitoring the situation, and instructions were being sent to maneuver against the
Tomcats. This cat-and-mouse jockeying of position repeated, with each side attempting to
gain an advantage by taking a pursuit position from the rear. From this pursuit position, the
forward-looking radars and also the heat-seekers can lock on to the opposing aircrafts without
the possibility of that favor being returned. At twenty miles and closing fast from a
head-on position, it became evident that the Libyan MiGs had no intention of being escorted
out of this air space and every intent of engaging the F-14s. It is unclear whether the
Libyan MiGs were locking on to the F-14 Tomcats, but the WSO (the weapons system offi
cer, also referred to as radar intercept offi cer, RIO, at this time) onboard one of the F-14s
was advising the lead pilot to move the aircraft in position for an optimum launch. At this
distance and speed, the two opposing sides are fair games for the air-to-air missiles and
under intense pressure of oncoming MiGs, one of the F-14s fi red two Sparrow missiles that
did not come close to the target. In the heat of battle, the WSO had the radar in a trackand-
scan mode, which did not provide radar illumination to guide the Sparrow missiles
with passive radar guidance. The Sparrows pursue the target in response to the radar signal
illuminated by the launch aircraft. All of this transpired without the two sides having visual
contact of the other. Now, the MiGs appeared as specks in the sky, and the Tomcats
split up with the wingman heading directly into the MiGs while the lead Tomcat veered to
gain a rear position. The Tomcat approaching the MiGs this time successfully locked the
radar onto one of the bogeys and fi red, resulting in a spectacular explosion. Incredibly, the
pilot escaped in an ejection chute. The lead Tomcat fi nally gained the pursuit angle on the
remaining MiG and fi red a short-range, heat-seeking Sidewinder that tracked the jet exhaust
heat and made contact. The entire sequence lasted approximately four minutes, and
most of the battle was fought in the radar space without visual contact. Not a single shot of
the Vulcan cannon was fi red.
A new era in the use of the air force in highly coordinated, precision attacks was opened
during the Operation Desert Shield in 1991. Although only 5 percent of all the munitions
delivered during this operation was of the guided type, it proved that optimal use of the air
power could debilitate the entire defense infrastructure of the opposing side, starting from
the command and control down to the infantry level dug in foxholes. The lopsided superiority
of the coalition aircraft and pilots were proven at the outset by the fact that thirtynine
of the outdated Iraqi MiGs were promptly shot down. In the next days, some of the
remaining Iraqi aircraft sought refuge in Iran to become permanent properties of Iran, and
the brief phase of the air-to-air encounters ended without much drama. Although there
were some 800 Iraqi aircraft, few of them challenged the coalition air force. U.S. Navy and
Air Force AWACS airplanes located and identifi ed Iraqi threats from the outset, in some
cases alerting the nearby coalition aircraft to fi re their SAM missiles to destroy Iraqi aircrafts
just as they cleared the runway during takeoff. In another instance, a Navy F/A-18
pilot was alerted of an approaching Iraqi fi ghter and using a Sidewinder missile recorded a
beyond-the-visual-range kill forty seconds after the AWACS alert. The overall result was
a complete control of the air space from which coordinated, multidimensional attacks on
the Iraqi targets could be made at will and with minimal losses, human or machine, to the
coalition side. During the second operation against Iraq ten years later, Operation Enduring
Freedom, a similar approach was taken except with much increased size and performance

of the guided munitions delivered either by aircraft or cruise missiles. In both instances,
the fi rst strikes were targeted against radar defenses and command/control sites so that the
air space could be cleared for subsequent operations.
Although the fi rst of the bombings on Baghdad was broadcast live a little before 7 PM
EST on January 17, 1991, the real war had started in the darkness of the southern Iraq-
Saudi Arabia border about two hours before the fi rst wave of F-117 stealth fi ghter-bombers
reached Baghdad. Iraq had built one of the most extensive air defense systems in the world
by this time, following the 1981 Israeli air raids on its nuclear reactor facility. This heavy
air defense network consisted of seventy-three radar sites, 400 observational posts, sixty
surface-to-air (SAM) missile batteries, and close to 2000 anti-aircraft guns, all of them
linked to seventeen regional command posts, four sector operator centers, and the Air
Defense Headquarters in Baghdad. The heavy volume of communication was handled
through microwave relays and fi ber optic cables to and from a central command computer
installed by a French contractor, Thomson-CSF. This modern air defense in principle
would detect any encroachments by foreign aircraft, and appropriate measures could be
quickly deployed to defeat them. As described in Chapter 3, a small gap in this dense network
of radars was identifi ed, and a squadron of AH-64 attack and USAF Pavelow helicopters
slipped in at low altitude to knock out the two forward radar installations forty
miles apart from one another without raising alarm to the rest of the network. This operation
allowed streaming of massive waves of aircrafts through the corridor thus created.
The fi rst wave to follow the helicopter attack was a fl eet of twenty-two F-15E Strike Eagles
along with EF-111 Ravens electronic warfare aircraft. This wave focused on high-priority
targets such as fi xed Scud missile launch sites, while the EF-111 Ravens jammed the Iraqi air
defense radars so that they could not fi nd a fi x on the F-15E’s locations. As the fl yable corridor
was yet quite limited, only the F-117 Nighthawk stealth fi ghter-bombers and Tomahawk
cruise missiles made bombing raids on Baghdad. The primary targets in Baghdad again
were sector operation centers, command bunkers, power grid sites, telecommunication centers,
the Ba’ath Party Headquarters, and the presidential palaces. At 3:45 AM Baghdad time,
a formation of thirteen-ft-long unmanned drone aircrafts was sent over key radar installations,
making themselves appear as heavy bombers making a run to Baghdad. Soon, the Iraqi
radars locked on to guide hundreds of SAM and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fi res to fi ll
the sky, except that the only real fl ying objects were the coalition HARM (high-speed
anti-radiation missiles) that locked on to the lit radars and promptly knocked them out. At
one point during this bait-and-hit operation, there were close to 200 Iraqi SAM missiles in
the air jabbing wildly at the drone decoys, and roughly one-quarter of the Iraqi SAMs were
expended in this manner during the fi rst day of combat with minimal effectiveness. This
pattern continued for several days with the F-117s attacking Baghdad during the night, the
Tomahawks during the day, and decoy/HARM combinations at any time.
Modern fi ghter aircraft today are a culmination of many technological breakthroughs in
diverse engineering disciplines ranging from avionics, fl ight control, material, and aerodynamics
to propulsion system. Control of the air space in modern battles gives the army
unprecedented freedom and authority on the ground. The ability to monitor the troop and
weapon movement and deployment, combined with the air-to-ground strike capabilities
to destroy the military and high-priority targets such as command and control sites, essentially
assures a lopsided battle for those who can command the air space. In addition,
movement of aircraft through the air is fast and far-reaching. Aerial refueling allows strategic
bombers to stay in the air for extended periods of time. Ground troop support from
carrier-based aircraft in response to evolving battle situations has become a standard tactics
of the U.S. forces deployed in faraway locations. For this reason, all of the world’s
major powers have invested their technological and ecomore potent jet fi ghters and bombers. In this chapter, we examine the technological advancements
found in some of these aircrafts.

Source:
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OF THE WORLD.

 

[BLACKEAGLE]

UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT
The F-15 Eagle fi ghter aircraft that once was the mainstay of the U.S. Air Force in maintaining
air superiority is shown in Fig. 1.1. The F-15 Eagle has several versions from F-15A
to F-15E and represents the main all-weather tactical fi ghter for the U.S. Air Force and also
for several ally nations (Israel, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea). Developed in response
to the alarming improvements in Russian fi ghters such as the MiG-25 Foxbat, F-15
Eagles lived well up to their expectations by continuously outperforming any contending
aircraft in various air battles. In fact, on record no F-15 fi ghter was lost in an aerial combat.
Although two F-15Es were brought down by ground fi re in the Iraqi theater in 1991, its superiority
in aerial engagements is unprecedented as given by the accumulated statistics of
104 kills against 0 losses in aerial battle. Since 1979, F-15s have been deployed in battle
mainly by the Israeli and U.S. forces, and they continuously overwhelmed adversaries with
superior electronic and maneuver capabilities, shooting down mostly Russian-made aircraft
ranging from MiG-21 “Fishbeds,” MiG-23 “Floggers,” MiG-25 “Foxbats,” and MiG-29 “Fulcrums,”
to Su-25 “Frogfoots,” Su-22 “Fitters,” and French Mirage F1s fl own by the Iraqis.
Given the success of the F-15 and subsequent, more advanced fi ghters produced by the
American aerospace industry, it may come as a small surprise that the F-15 emerged as a
replacement for the F-4 Phantom jets, which were clearly outclassed by the Russian jet
fi ghters of the time. It is no coincidence that the size and even the exterior of the F-15
aircraft resembles those of MiG-25 because it was the aim of the U.S. military to combat
the threats posed by the class of Russian jet fi ghters at the time. Further revelations of the
actual performance, however, have proven that in spite of the Russian jets’ record-breaking
speed and rate-of-climb, their size and weight made these heavyweights vulnerable in
dogfi ghts due to lack of maneuverability. F-15s, however, made extensive use of titanium
in the airframe to lower their bulk weight. Adding to this formula was the then state-of-theart
power plant, Pratt and Whitney F-100-PW-100 turbofan engines. These engines provided
a 25,000 lb thrust with the afterburners running, which was eight times the engine
weight. Also, the small wing area and advanced control systems allowed the F-15 then
unprecedented maneuverability in addition to its range and armament capacity.
The letter designation for F-15 follows its evolution from its introduction to the U.S.
Air Force in 1976:
F-15A: The version introduced in 1976, single seat.
F-15B: Two-seat trainer version of F-15A.
F-15C: Improved version of F-15A. 2000 lb of additional internal fuel capacity, external
conformal fuel tanks, and improved power plant allowing for maximum takeoff weight
of 68,000 lb.
F-15D: Two-seat trainer version of F-15C.
F-15E: Two-seat, all-purpose version for deep strike and interdiction. Improved weapons
control and electronics.
Although, the F-15E Strike Eagle is based on the same airframe as the preceding F-15
series, it is perceived as an aircraft in a different class both by its pilots and military analysts.
It has capabilities far exceeding its predecessors. To handle the advanced weapons
control systems, the F-15E allows for a weapon system offi cer (WSO) to sit behind the
pilot. The added capabilities allow F-15Es to carry out long-range ground assault missions
under any conditions. Table 1.1 gives some of the main characteristics of the F-15E Strike
Eagle. F-15E armaments include air-to-air missiles like AIM-9, AIM-7, various guided
bombs such as CBU-10, -12, -15, and -25, and an air-to-ground missile, AGM-65. Some
of the key electronic gears are the synthetic aperture radar, head-up display (HUD), and
LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night).
Although the F-15’s prowess was well recognized, it was a large and expensive aircraft.
Though many of the shortcomings of the F-4 Phantom were overcome using superior
technology, the F-15 got big and costly to give heavy armament capabilities and fl ight
performance. Proponents within the U.S. Air Force for small, agile aircraft more suitable

Table 1.1. F-15E Specifications.
Length 63.8 ft (19.45 m)
Wingspan: 42.8 ft (13.05 m)
Height: 18.5 ft (5.64 m)
Maximum Take-Off Weight: 81,000 lb (36,818 kg)
Power Plant: 2 Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-229
afterburning turbofans
Total Thrust 58,200 lb
Maximum Speed High altitude: Mach 2.5 or 1650 mph (2655 km/h)
Low altitude: Mach 1.2 or 900 mph (1450 km/h)
Ceiling: 65,000 ft (20,000 m)
Range: 3500 miles (5600 km)
Rate of Climb: 50,000 ft/min (255 m/s)
Thrust-to-Weight ratio: 1.30

for air combat got what they wished in the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Smaller and less expensive
than the F-15, the F-16 would have unparalleled maneuverability at the time of its
introduction, transient performance including acceleration and climb at all speed ranges,
along with effective armaments for air combat. The Lightweight Fighter (LWF) program
out of which the F-16 originated had objectives of developing a highly capable aircraft of
20,000-lb weight (about half that of the F-15), low cost of production and operation, and
high performance at Mach 1.6 and below and at altitudes of 40,000 feet and below. The
cost for the F-16A/B would turn out to be about $15 million per airplane, about half the
cost of the F-15 and one-tenth that of the ultramodern F-22 described next. Yet, the F-16
featured many of the technological advances, some beyond even those of the F-15. The
F-16 was intentionally designed to be aerodynamically unstable with the center of gravity
well behind the center of lift at the main wing. The natural tendency for the aircraft then
is to pitch up and go out of control. Thus, the aerodynamic surfaces like the horizontal
stabilizers need to be constantly engaged to maintain the aircraft’s level motion. This stabilization
is performed by onboard quadruple-redundant computers in what is known as
fl y-by-wire. As opposed to direct hydraulic control of the aerodynamic surfaces by the
pilot’s control stick, the computer receives the pilot input digitally (i.e., by wire) and
computes the necessary confi gurations for the desired aircraft attitude and motion. The
confi guration data are then transmitted again via wire to the hydraulics, which in turn
rotate the aerodynamic surfaces. The fl y-by-wire has much quicker response, and because
the aircraft is naturally unstable its ability to go into unusual fl ight angles is much greater
(i.e., the aircraft becomes much more agile). The higher agility means that it can make
high-G turns, which was limited to about 7 Gs in previous aircrafts. By reclining the pilot
seat to thirty degrees instead of the usual thirteen degrees and placing the control stick to
the right side with an armrest, F-16 pilots could withstand and control up to 9-G turns.
Also, the blended body design where the wing gradually merged with the aircraft body
reduced the aerodynamic drag while increasing the available space for internal fuel storage.
The increased fuel capacity and an effi cient turbofan engine (General Electric F110-
GE-100) give the F-16 an exceptional range (2435 miles) for an aircraft of its size.
We can see the next plateau in the military aircraft technology in the recent addition
to the U.S. Air Force fi ghter fl eet, the F-22 Raptor shown in Figs. 1.2 to 1.4. The F-22
Raptor design originated from the need to replace the aging F-15 Eagles and provide the
USAF with a dominant super-fi ghter that will ensure air superiority for the next several
decades. In spite of the F-15 Eagle’s modern look, they were introduced to service back
Figure 1.2.

in 1976. Even with all the successes of the F-15 program,
vast advances in military aircraft technology have taken
place. Many of these advances and several new ones are
embedded in the F-22 Raptor, which entered service in
2005. New materials such as advanced alloys and composite
material are used in the Raptor airframe, aerodynamic
surfaces, and engine components. The control is
vastly improved for both routine and high-G maneuvers
using fl y-by-wire system. The computerized control of
the F-22, as opposed to direct pilot control, allows the
aircraft to perform highly unstable maneuvers. For example,
the F-22 can fl y at an angle of attack of sixty degrees,
well beyond the stall limit of the aircraft. The
power plant gets an even higher effi ciency thrust, along
with advanced thrust vectoring, using Pratt and Whitney
pitch-vectoring turbofans. The electronic equipment
is so far advanced that the F-22 can serve as an
advance airborne station for electronic warfare and battlefi
eld intelligence management. The complex radar
and sensor inputs are synthesized and displayed to the
pilot in integrated avionics displays to maximize the
situational awareness and decision abilities of the operator.
The sensitive suite of sensors is designed to always
give the F-22 the fi rst-kill option long before the opposing
aircraft or targets are even aware of the presence of this
stealth fi ghter. The airframe geometry, material, and the
exhaust section have all been designed for reduced visual
and electromagnetic observability, essential for survivability
and preemptive strike roles. Two Pratt and Whitney
engines propel the F-22 to supersonic cruise speeds
and give unmatched agility with vector thrust nozzles.

All of the previously mentioned technological advances did not come without a high
price tag. Many of the new technologies were researched and developed as part of the F-22
project. If all the development costs are added in, each F-22 carries a price tag of over $300
million. In fact, the next-generation joint strike fi ghter (JSF), the F-35, is under development
so that these advanced technologies can be furnished at lower cost and in larger
volume. The high cost of the F-22 also makes some of the existing aircraft such as the
F-15, F-16, and F-18 indispensable elements of the American airborne capabilities. Table
1.2 shows some of the main specifi cations of the F-22.
The F-22 airframe can be divided into three major sub-frames that are manufactured by
different companies. The forward fuselage along with the fi ns (vertical and horizontal
stabilizers), fl aps, ailerons, and leading-edge fl aps in the wings comprise one sub-frame
group that is made by Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA. Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth,
TX, constructs the complex mid-fuselage that measures 17 feet in length and 15 feet in
width, prior to assembly with other sub-frames. This section houses the core of the hydraulics
and electronic networks. The aft fuselage section is built by Boeing and includes the
main wings, power supplies, auxiliary power units (APUs), and other sub-components.
Much of the structural load on the aircraft is supported by the fi ve titanium bulkheads in
the mid-fuselage. The clipped delta wings are designed for effi ciency at high speeds and
have ailerons, fl aperons, and leading-edge fl aps to give an enlarged fl ight envelope. The
leading-edge fl aps, for example, maintain controlled fl ow over the wings at high angles of
attack over sixty degrees. The internal space of the wings, as in other aircraft, serves as fuel
tanks. The ailerons operate in opposite directions in both wings to provide roll force,
while the fl aperon increases lift and controls the fl ow at high angles of attack. The horizontal
stabilizers also shield the engine exhaust radiation, in addition to performing as a
pitch-control aerodynamic surface. The vertical stabilizers are angled in the same direction
as the sloped aft fuselage. The heavier armaments like the AIM-120 AMRAAM
GBU-30 1000-lb bombs are kept in an internal weapon bay with retractable covers, and
the two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles are also stored internally near the air intake. The internal
storage decreases both the aerodynamic drag and radar refl ection signatures. M61A2
20-mm-caliber Vulcan rotating cannon gives the continuous fi re capability of 480 rounds.
The primary airframe, the mid-fuselage, is a unifi ed structure manufactured using an advanced
casting process. Using a high-pressure injection of molten titanium in an autoclave,
the complex mid-fuselage is constructed as a single structure with no welds or joints.
Table 1.2. F-22 Specifi cations.
Length 62.1 ft (18.9 m)
Wingspan 44.5 ft (13.56 m)
Height 16.8 ft (5.08 m)
Maximum Take-Off Weight 80,000 lb (36,288 kg)
Power Plant 2 Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100
pitch-vectoring turbofans with afterburners
Total Thrust 70,000 lb
Maximum Speed High altitude: Mach 2.42 or 1600 mph (2570 km/h)
Low altitude: Mach 1.72 or 1140 mph (1826 km/h)
Ceiling 65,000 ft (20,000 m)
Range 2000 miles (5600 km)
Rate of Climb N/A (classifi ed)
Thrust-to-Weight Ratio 1.26
Maximum G-load –3/+9.5

This method achieves high-strength integrity with reduced weight and machining time.
Composite materials and specialized alloys are used for critical components to provide
strength at low weight and radar signatures.
The stealth capability encompasses minimizing radar, visual, infrared, and audible signatures,
with the radar being the most critical. The radar cross-section, or RCS, is a measure
of the aircraft’s visibility when illuminated by a radar beam and basically means the
equivalent cross-sectional area of a surface if that surface were to refl ect all of the incident
radar energy. A large bird, for example, has an RCS of 0.01 m2 , much smaller than its actual
cross-sectional area because a bird’s feather does not refl ect radar energy effi ciently.
The B-2 bomber, with somewhat earlier stealth technologies and larger dimensions, has a
RCS of 0.75 m2 . The RCS of the F-22 is estimated to 0.01 m2 , about the same as a large
bird and essentially invisible to the radar. First, all of the F-22 surfaces tend to form acute
angles, so that the incident radar does not bounce back to the source to reveal its presence.
For example, the F-22 has a cross-sectional shape of a fl at triangle and straight-line features
on the aircraft are replaced with W-shaped lines. Radar-absorbing paints and materials
are used for all of the exposed surfaces. The rotating engine fans are a signifi cant
contributor to RCS, and in the F-22 the serpentine inlet duct does not allow the radar
beam to make contact with the engine fan. Even the radar refl ection from the pilot’s helmet
through the canopy has been taken into account. The glass canopy is plated with radar-
insulating thin fi lm while maintaining 85 percent transmission of the visible light.
Thus, the entire canopy can be considered as a radar fi lter. The exhaust is the most critical
component in minimizing infrared signatures that can be imaged by FLIR (forward-looking
infrared) or IR sensors in heat-seeking missiles. The exhaust of the F-22 is designed to
absorb the heat by using ceramic components, rather than conduct heat to the outside
surface. Also, the horizontal stabilizers are placed to shield the thermal emission as much
as possible. The camoufl age paint schemes blend the aircraft into the sky when viewed
from below and into the ground when observed from the top. Vapor trails and other telltale
contrails are aerodynamically suppressed.
The Pratt and Whitney F119-PW-100 engine is another component in the F-22 that is
arguably the most advanced in aircraft technology. Each of these engines generates more
thrust without the afterburner than conventional engines with full afterburner power on,
and its supersonic thrust is also about twice the other engines in the class. Using two of
these engines to develop a total thrust of 70,000 pounds, the F-22 can travel at supersonic
speeds without the afterburners for fuel-effi cient high-speed cruise to the target area. This
level of thrust is more than the aircraft weight and enables the F-22 to fl y vertically upward
much like a rocket. The F119 engine is also unique in fully integrating the vector thrust
nozzle into the engine/airframe combination for a twenty-degree up/down redirection of
thrust for high-G turn capabilities. The thrust vectoring is designed to enhance the turn
rates by up to 50 percent in comparison to using control surfaces alone. The engine achieves
all these functional characteristics with 40 percent fewer parts than conventional engines
to furnish exceptional reliability and maintenance and repair access. In a design method
called integrated product development, inputs from assembly line workers and air force mechanics
were incorporated to streamline the entire sequence of engine production, maintenance,
and repairs. These design innovations are expected to reduce the support equipment,
labor, and spare parts in demand by approximately one-half. Similar to the mid-fuselage
airframe, the turbine stage consisting of the disk and blades is constructed in a single, integrated
metal piece for high integrity at lower weight, better performance, and thermal
insulation for the turbine disk cavity. The fan and compressor blade designs went through
extensive permutations and modifi cations using computational fl uid dynamic (CFD) simulations,
resulting in unprecedented effi ciency in both sections. Hardware cut-and-try of
different designs would have cost way too much time and money. High-strength and degradation-
resistant “Alloy C” was used in key components like the compressors, turbines,
and nozzles to allow the engine to run at higher temperatures, one of the important contributing
factors to the increased thrust and durability of F119 engines. The combustor,
the hottest component in the engine, uses oxidation-resistant, thermally insulating cobalt
coatings. A digital electronic engine control device called FADEC (dual-redundant digital
engine controls) not only fi ne-tunes the engine operating parameters to deliver the
highest performance at the maximum effi ciency, but also establishes responsive and precise
engine operating parameters with inputs from the pilot control of the throttle and the
engine/flight sensors.

 

[Comrade]

Its just scary information.....