After Iran, Pakistan?

[Winchester]

ALTHOUGH most Iranians are celebrating their nuclear deal with the P5+1, the framework ‘understanding’, once implemented, will effectively block Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons capability for the foreseeable future.

Hardly a week after the Iran deal was announced, the New York Times — which often reflects official US policy — editorially propagated that attention be turned to constraining Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities. The issue was also covered by other US media.

The NYT arguments, taken from the Indian hymnbook, were not surprising; the timing of the proposal to target Pakistan is significant. If the editorial indeed reflects official US thinking, it would confirm the view of many in Pakistan and the Muslim world that America’s aim is to denuclearise all Islamic countries. With Iran neutralised, Pakistan remains the only nuclear-capable Islamic nation.

The world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains ‘obsessed’ with India.
Pakistan has fought off numerous US attempts, initially to prevent and, after 1998, to retard Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic programmes. Pakistan’s ‘establishment’ is confident that future attempts will fail also. But, it would be a mistake to become complacent.

The US is engaged in a strategic contest with China. It sees India as a ‘strategic partner’ in this Asian power game. India can challenge China effectively only once it has neutralised Pakistan. The Indian lobby in the US is now second in influence only to the Israeli lobby. Thus, unless persuaded otherwise, Washington can be expected to do all that is possible to assist India in neutralising Pakistan’s power.

The following stratagem, used against Iran and others, may be used to restrict Pakistan:

First, concerns about Pakistan’s programmes will be spread through the media and diplomatic channels. Then, Islamabad would be pressed to give assurances and accept constraints ostensibly to assuage these ‘concerns’.

Next, an effort would be made to translate these restraints and restrictions into binding commitments, including through the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the IAEA and the UN Security Council.

If Pakistan then ‘violates’ such restrictions, it would be subjected to multilateral or unilateral sanctions.

Numerous grounds will be cited to restrain Pakistan. Previously, it was argued that Pakistan was a nuclear proliferator; that its nuclear weapons could be captured by ‘Islamist terrorists’; that the Pakistan Army could turn ‘Islamist’. The new tack, reflected in the editorial, is that:

— Pakistan should no longer be “obsessed” with India, which is now preoccupied with becoming “a regional economic and political power”;

— Pakistan’s nuclear and military deployments against India are destabilising; and;

— Pakistan is descending into chaos.

These motivated assertions need to be refuted effectively. Pakistan’s diplomacy should be actively mobilised for the purpose.

First, the world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains “obsessed” with India. As the editorial itself observes (almost approvingly), Prime Minister Modi has threatened “retaliation” against Pakistan “if Islamic militants carry out a terror attack in India” — irrespective of whether or not the Pakistan government is responsible for this. Given Modi’s aggressive policies in Kashmir and the BJP’s persecution of Indian Muslims, such a “terrorist” attack appears almost inevitable, sooner or later. If Modi’s doctrine is applied, an India-Pakistan conflict also becomes inevitable.

The Indian threat is real “on the ground”. Over 70pc of India’s land, air and sea forces are deployed against Pakistan. India’s capability for aggression against Pakistan is being rapidly enlarged by the $100 billion in advanced weaponry being sold to it including by the US, Europe and Israel. Indian generals have not disavowed their ‘Cold Start’ doctrine envisaging a sudden and massive attack against Pakistan.

Pakistan’s is not the “fastest growing nuclear arsenal”. In fact, with the revival of their Cold War post the Ukraine crisis, the US and Russia have deployed the largest number of additional nuclear weapons last year. Pakistan’s warheads are estimated in the Western media by assuming that all of its fissile material production capacity is being transformed into nuclear warheads. On the same assumption, India’s arsenal would be much larger than projected, since foreign nuclear fuel supplies, authorised by the Suppliers’ Group, enable India to use all of its indigenous uranium for weapons purposes.

The size of nuclear arsenals is relevant for mutual deterrence. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union built over 20,000 warheads. Several US ‘experts’ have asserted that with its capacity to build a larger arsenal, and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, and a ‘second strike’ capability, India would be able to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities in a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Pakistan can best preserve nuclear deterrence by developing larger and survivable numbers of nuclear warheads.

Likewise, Pakistan’s recently tested long-range missiles are defensive; designed to ensure that India cannot threaten Pakistan with impunity from the Nicobar and Andaman Islands or its long-range nuclear submarines.

Similarly, the deployment of nuclear-capable tactical missiles was in direct response to India’s growing and advanced military deployments and repeated threats to attack Pakistan. (It is similar to Nato’s deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons during the Cold War against the larger conventional forces of the Soviet Union.)

The assertion that Pakistan is “descending into chaos” is palpably false. Today, the politics of the street is over; the economy has stabilised, and a concerted civil-military campaign is under way to combat TTP terrorism and the Baloch insurgents, with the cooperation of the new Afghan government. (Meanwhile, 17 insurgencies simmer within India, unremarked by the Western media.)

The potentially disastrous consequences of the India-Pakistan nuclear and military stand-off cannot be left to be debated in the news media. But India refuses to discuss this seriously.

Under the circumstances, it would be wise for Pakistan to ask the US: if India indeed threatens to launch an attack against Pakistan after a ‘terrorist’ incident, will the US intervene to prevent the conflict, or to prevent Pakistan from resorting to nuclear deterrence?

The central question which Pakistan must pose to the world is: if the aim is to prevent a South Asian catastrophe, is it not better for the world powers to promote an equitable solution to the Kashmir dispute and an agreement on mutual military restraint between Pakistan and India?

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, April 12th, 2015

After Iran, Pakistan? - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

 

[SQ8]

Interestingly, the gentlemen is stating my exact thoughts on the matter. What he has failed to include however, is once those nukes go.. India will exact its plans with a blood thirst that will make ISIS quiver.

 

[Winchester]

Interestingly, the gentlemen is stating my exact thoughts on the matter. What he has failed to include however, is once those nukes go.. India will exact its plans with a blood thirst that will make ISIS quiver.

Well he has alluded to it

As the editorial itself observes (almost approvingly), Prime Minister Modi has threatened “retaliation” against Pakistan “if Islamic militants carry out a terror attack in India” — irrespective of whether or not the Pakistan government is responsible for this. Given Modi’s aggressive policies in Kashmir and the BJP’s persecution of Indian Muslims,

 

[A1Kaid]

Hardly a week after the Iran deal was announced, the New York Times — which often reflects official US policy — editorially propagated that attention be turned to constraining Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities. The issue was also covered by other US media.

Biggest false premise of the entire article. NYT is a private newspaper that reflects the thoughts and opinions of their own writers, editorialists, and journalists, not official US policy.

The US is engaged in a strategic contest with China. It sees India as a ‘strategic partner’ in this Asian power game. India can challenge China effectively only once it has neutralised Pakistan. The Indian lobby in the US is now second in influence only to the Israeli lobby.

This is another incorrect belief the writer holds. The Indian lobby isn't the second most influential, even Armenian and Greek lobbies hold more influence then them. Also no matter what lobbies will never get the final say in US foreign policies.

Thus, unless persuaded otherwise, Washington can be expected to do all that is possible to assist India in neutralising Pakistan’s power.

This man is a fool. US has no policy to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear assets, as US understands it is impossible to do that at this point. Pakistan has too many nukes, too many facilities, and too many nuclear weapons engineers.

These motivated assertions need to be refuted effectively. Pakistan’s diplomacy should be actively mobilised for the purpose.

That's true, but NYT statements and opinions are not official US policy.

This is a really bad article full of conspiracy nonsense and multiple false premises that lead to incorrect interpretations. The author is confused and interprets NYT opinions and statements as a reflection of official US foreign policy.

 

[Husnainshah]

Pakistan's one tough son of a bitch. US would have to go through China at least to denuclearize Pakistan without denuclearizing Bharat. I don't see that happening. Period.

 

[Kaniska]

No..it will not happen..Because, Iran is a power in the religion..and above all Iran confronts with Israel who is a buddy of US but Pakistan is neither a power of its own nor it confronts any US interests in general..Rather US will stand with you.....You have to understand US statergy...US confronts with them who are a rising power in any region...It does not confront with its friends and followers..

ALTHOUGH most Iranians are celebrating their nuclear deal with the P5+1, the framework ‘understanding’, once implemented, will effectively block Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons capability for the foreseeable future.

Hardly a week after the Iran deal was announced, the New York Times — which often reflects official US policy — editorially propagated that attention be turned to constraining Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities. The issue was also covered by other US media.

The NYT arguments, taken from the Indian hymnbook, were not surprising; the timing of the proposal to target Pakistan is significant. If the editorial indeed reflects official US thinking, it would confirm the view of many in Pakistan and the Muslim world that America’s aim is to denuclearise all Islamic countries. With Iran neutralised, Pakistan remains the only nuclear-capable Islamic nation.

The world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains ‘obsessed’ with India.
Pakistan has fought off numerous US attempts, initially to prevent and, after 1998, to retard Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic programmes. Pakistan’s ‘establishment’ is confident that future attempts will fail also. But, it would be a mistake to become complacent.

The US is engaged in a strategic contest with China. It sees India as a ‘strategic partner’ in this Asian power game. India can challenge China effectively only once it has neutralised Pakistan. The Indian lobby in the US is now second in influence only to the Israeli lobby. Thus, unless persuaded otherwise, Washington can be expected to do all that is possible to assist India in neutralising Pakistan’s power.

The following stratagem, used against Iran and others, may be used to restrict Pakistan:

First, concerns about Pakistan’s programmes will be spread through the media and diplomatic channels. Then, Islamabad would be pressed to give assurances and accept constraints ostensibly to assuage these ‘concerns’.

Next, an effort would be made to translate these restraints and restrictions into binding commitments, including through the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the IAEA and the UN Security Council.

If Pakistan then ‘violates’ such restrictions, it would be subjected to multilateral or unilateral sanctions.

Numerous grounds will be cited to restrain Pakistan. Previously, it was argued that Pakistan was a nuclear proliferator; that its nuclear weapons could be captured by ‘Islamist terrorists’; that the Pakistan Army could turn ‘Islamist’. The new tack, reflected in the editorial, is that:

— Pakistan should no longer be “obsessed” with India, which is now preoccupied with becoming “a regional economic and political power”;

— Pakistan’s nuclear and military deployments against India are destabilising; and;

— Pakistan is descending into chaos.

These motivated assertions need to be refuted effectively. Pakistan’s diplomacy should be actively mobilised for the purpose.

First, the world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains “obsessed” with India. As the editorial itself observes (almost approvingly), Prime Minister Modi has threatened “retaliation” against Pakistan “if Islamic militants carry out a terror attack in India” — irrespective of whether or not the Pakistan government is responsible for this. Given Modi’s aggressive policies in Kashmir and the BJP’s persecution of Indian Muslims, such a “terrorist” attack appears almost inevitable, sooner or later. If Modi’s doctrine is applied, an India-Pakistan conflict also becomes inevitable.

The Indian threat is real “on the ground”. Over 70pc of India’s land, air and sea forces are deployed against Pakistan. India’s capability for aggression against Pakistan is being rapidly enlarged by the $100 billion in advanced weaponry being sold to it including by the US, Europe and Israel. Indian generals have not disavowed their ‘Cold Start’ doctrine envisaging a sudden and massive attack against Pakistan.

Pakistan’s is not the “fastest growing nuclear arsenal”. In fact, with the revival of their Cold War post the Ukraine crisis, the US and Russia have deployed the largest number of additional nuclear weapons last year. Pakistan’s warheads are estimated in the Western media by assuming that all of its fissile material production capacity is being transformed into nuclear warheads. On the same assumption, India’s arsenal would be much larger than projected, since foreign nuclear fuel supplies, authorised by the Suppliers’ Group, enable India to use all of its indigenous uranium for weapons purposes.

The size of nuclear arsenals is relevant for mutual deterrence. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union built over 20,000 warheads. Several US ‘experts’ have asserted that with its capacity to build a larger arsenal, and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, and a ‘second strike’ capability, India would be able to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities in a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Pakistan can best preserve nuclear deterrence by developing larger and survivable numbers of nuclear warheads.

Likewise, Pakistan’s recently tested long-range missiles are defensive; designed to ensure that India cannot threaten Pakistan with impunity from the Nicobar and Andaman Islands or its long-range nuclear submarines.

Similarly, the deployment of nuclear-capable tactical missiles was in direct response to India’s growing and advanced military deployments and repeated threats to attack Pakistan. (It is similar to Nato’s deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons during the Cold War against the larger conventional forces of the Soviet Union.)

The assertion that Pakistan is “descending into chaos” is palpably false. Today, the politics of the street is over; the economy has stabilised, and a concerted civil-military campaign is under way to combat TTP terrorism and the Baloch insurgents, with the cooperation of the new Afghan government. (Meanwhile, 17 insurgencies simmer within India, unremarked by the Western media.)

The potentially disastrous consequences of the India-Pakistan nuclear and military stand-off cannot be left to be debated in the news media. But India refuses to discuss this seriously.

Under the circumstances, it would be wise for Pakistan to ask the US: if India indeed threatens to launch an attack against Pakistan after a ‘terrorist’ incident, will the US intervene to prevent the conflict, or to prevent Pakistan from resorting to nuclear deterrence?

The central question which Pakistan must pose to the world is: if the aim is to prevent a South Asian catastrophe, is it not better for the world powers to promote an equitable solution to the Kashmir dispute and an agreement on mutual military restraint between Pakistan and India?

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, April 12th, 2015

After Iran, Pakistan? - Newspaper - DAWN.COM

 

[East or West India Best]

how irrational.

 

[gomerker23]

maybe

 

[Cyberian]

The only way Pakistan will give up its nukes would be to detonate all of them on India, thus, bringing into play Pakistan's "Extinction India" doctrine.

 

[Donatello]

Better expend those nukes than give them up.

 

[Red Wolf]

Biggest false premise of the entire article. NYT is a private newspaper that reflects the thoughts and opinions of their own writers, editorialists, and journalists, not official US policy.

NYT op-eds, to some extent, reflects what U.S. policy makers think. And those who weren't thinking about it before will certainly pay more attention to the issue after reading the op-ed.

This man is a fool. US has no policy to neutralize Pakistan's nuclear assets, as US understands it is impossible to do that at this point. Pakistan has too many nukes, too many facilities, and too many nuclear weapons engineers.

This is one of the obstacles in denuclearizing a nation-state, i.e., what happens to the trained man power? These highly trained individuals won't go back to making cheap radio clocks. Its more likely that they would be absorbed by another state with nuclear ambitions. In most (all?) cases, its better to degrade the nuclear infrastructure to a more benign state then completely eradicate it.

 

[A1Kaid]

NYT op-eds, to some extent, reflects what U.S. policy makers think. And those who weren't thinking about it before will certainly pay more attention to the issue after reading the op-ed.

This is one of the obstacles in denuclearizing a nation-state, i.e., what happens to the trained man power? These highly trained individuals won't go back to making cheap radio clocks. Its more likely that they would be absorbed by another state with nuclear ambitions. In most (all?) cases, its better to degrade the nuclear infrastructure to a more benign state then completely eradicate it.

You overestimate the NYT, sometimes they are critical of the President sometimes they support him. They don't reflect what US policy makers think, they may discuss what US policy makers are thinking, but that is different because you're saying whatever the NYT says is also a reflection of US policy. NYT is a very liberal newspaper they reflect what liberal intellectuals think.

Was the NYT reflecting what US policy makers when they help release Wikileaks documents?

 

[Red Wolf]

NYT op-eds, to some extent, reflects what U.S. policy makers think. And those who weren't thinking about it before will certainly pay more attention to the issue after reading the op-ed.

You overestimate the NYT, sometimes they are critical of the President sometimes they support him. They don't reflect what US policy makers think, they may discuss what US policy makers are thinking, but that is different because you're saying whatever the NYT says is also a reflection of US policy. NYT is a very liberal newspaper they reflect what liberal intellectuals think.

You are wasting your time on the most inconsequential aspect of the article. Read the second half of my argument.

1. If Saddam was alive today, he would disagrees with you about the whole 'overestimating the NYT'.
2. Even if you assume that there was no debate about Pakistani nuclear weapons before, the op-ed will generate one. The fact that you and I are discussing it is itself evidence enough.
   
3. Pakistan now has to explain it's position or relinquish the narrative making to liberals and neo-cons.

Your approach to the article can be summed up nicely with:

Bottom line, it doesn't matter how you, I, or the author view NYT, it is a widely read publications. This will generate debate. You have to participate in it. Simple.

Was the NYT reflecting what US policy makers when they help release Wikileaks documents?

Meh, building their lost liberal creds.

 

[A1Kaid]

You are wasting your time on the most inconsequential aspect of the article. Read the second half of my argument.

1. If Saddam was alive today, he would disagrees with you about the whole 'overestimating the NYT'.
2. Even if you assume that there was no debate about Pakistani nuclear weapons before, the op-ed will generate one. The fact that you and I are discussing it is itself evidence enough.
   
3. Pakistan now has to explain it's position or relinquish the narrative making to liberals and neo-cons.

Your approach to the article can be summed up nicely with:

Bottom line, it doesn't matter how you, I, or the author view NYT, it is a widely read publications. This will generate debate. You have to participate in it. Simple.




Meh, building their lost liberal creds.

1. If Saddam was alive today, he would disagrees with you about the whole 'overestimating the NYT'.
2. Even if you assume that there was no debate about Pakistani nuclear weapons before, the op-ed will generate one. The fact that you and I are discussing it is itself evidence enough.
3. Pakistan now has to explain it's position or relinquish the narrative making to liberals and neo-cons.

Saddam was not targeted because NYT and media supported the war in Iraq, it was because the administration supported the war in Iraq and the media jumped on the bandwagon in supporting the administration and war on terror. If anything your point actually proves you wrong. George Bush didn't open the NYT and decided whether he should or should not attack Iraq, so you really make a naive and stupid point thinking newspaper headlines influence official US policy making.

Now if you were to make the case US Think-Tanks influence foreign-policy making that holds truth, but not newspapers. Newspaper report US foreign policy decisions they don't influence how they are formulated.

Even if you assume that there was no debate about Pakistani nuclear weapons before, the op-ed will generate one. The fact that you and I are discussing it is itself evidence enough.

It can generate public debate and discussion, fool it isn't going to generate debate by US foreign policymakers. US Secretary of State or Pres. Obama aren't going to say 'you know I don't think the NYT will like us supporting FSA in Syria maybe we shouldn't do it?' US foreign policy decisions are made independent of newspaper articles and op-eds. Newspaper and op-eds are for public consumption.

Pakistan now has to explain it's position or relinquish the narrative making to liberals and neo-cons.

No it doesn't you clown, maybe you think so or NYT thinks so, but Pakistan doesn't respond to newspaper headlines or op-eds. Pakistan will respond to actual statements from the US government in regards to relevant matters.

Honestly, you are jealous that Pakistan is a nuclear power and your country has no nukes and will never have them either.

 

[Thorough Pro]

What I find wrong with this analysis is it talks about only India and Pakistan, as though their nuclear war will be in isolation and will not affect other powers in the region America's interest in India is not out of love for curry masala, or against Pakistan, they want India to become a pain in china's behind, and to keep a check on India itself they do need Pakistan.

ALTHOUGH most Iranians are celebrating their nuclear deal with the P5+1, the framework ‘understanding’, once implemented, will effectively block Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons capability for the foreseeable future.

Hardly a week after the Iran deal was announced, the New York Times — which often reflects official US policy — editorially propagated that attention be turned to constraining Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities. The issue was also covered by other US media.

The NYT arguments, taken from the Indian hymnbook, were not surprising; the timing of the proposal to target Pakistan is significant. If the editorial indeed reflects official US thinking, it would confirm the view of many in Pakistan and the Muslim world that America’s aim is to denuclearise all Islamic countries. With Iran neutralised, Pakistan remains the only nuclear-capable Islamic nation.

The world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains ‘obsessed’ with India.
Pakistan has fought off numerous US attempts, initially to prevent and, after 1998, to retard Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic programmes. Pakistan’s ‘establishment’ is confident that future attempts will fail also. But, it would be a mistake to become complacent.

The US is engaged in a strategic contest with China. It sees India as a ‘strategic partner’ in this Asian power game. India can challenge China effectively only once it has neutralised Pakistan. The Indian lobby in the US is now second in influence only to the Israeli lobby. Thus, unless persuaded otherwise, Washington can be expected to do all that is possible to assist India in neutralising Pakistan’s power.

The following stratagem, used against Iran and others, may be used to restrict Pakistan:

First, concerns about Pakistan’s programmes will be spread through the media and diplomatic channels. Then, Islamabad would be pressed to give assurances and accept constraints ostensibly to assuage these ‘concerns’.

Next, an effort would be made to translate these restraints and restrictions into binding commitments, including through the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the IAEA and the UN Security Council.

If Pakistan then ‘violates’ such restrictions, it would be subjected to multilateral or unilateral sanctions.

Numerous grounds will be cited to restrain Pakistan. Previously, it was argued that Pakistan was a nuclear proliferator; that its nuclear weapons could be captured by ‘Islamist terrorists’; that the Pakistan Army could turn ‘Islamist’. The new tack, reflected in the editorial, is that:

— Pakistan should no longer be “obsessed” with India, which is now preoccupied with becoming “a regional economic and political power”;

— Pakistan’s nuclear and military deployments against India are destabilising; and;

— Pakistan is descending into chaos.

These motivated assertions need to be refuted effectively. Pakistan’s diplomacy should be actively mobilised for the purpose.

First, the world should be made to understand why Pakistan remains “obsessed” with India. As the editorial itself observes (almost approvingly), Prime Minister Modi has threatened “retaliation” against Pakistan “if Islamic militants carry out a terror attack in India” — irrespective of whether or not the Pakistan government is responsible for this. Given Modi’s aggressive policies in Kashmir and the BJP’s persecution of Indian Muslims, such a “terrorist” attack appears almost inevitable, sooner or later. If Modi’s doctrine is applied, an India-Pakistan conflict also becomes inevitable.

The Indian threat is real “on the ground”. Over 70pc of India’s land, air and sea forces are deployed against Pakistan. India’s capability for aggression against Pakistan is being rapidly enlarged by the $100 billion in advanced weaponry being sold to it including by the US, Europe and Israel. Indian generals have not disavowed their ‘Cold Start’ doctrine envisaging a sudden and massive attack against Pakistan.

Pakistan’s is not the “fastest growing nuclear arsenal”. In fact, with the revival of their Cold War post the Ukraine crisis, the US and Russia have deployed the largest number of additional nuclear weapons last year. Pakistan’s warheads are estimated in the Western media by assuming that all of its fissile material production capacity is being transformed into nuclear warheads. On the same assumption, India’s arsenal would be much larger than projected, since foreign nuclear fuel supplies, authorised by the Suppliers’ Group, enable India to use all of its indigenous uranium for weapons purposes.

The size of nuclear arsenals is relevant for mutual deterrence. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union built over 20,000 warheads. Several US ‘experts’ have asserted that with its capacity to build a larger arsenal, and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, and a ‘second strike’ capability, India would be able to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear and strategic capabilities in a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Pakistan can best preserve nuclear deterrence by developing larger and survivable numbers of nuclear warheads.

Likewise, Pakistan’s recently tested long-range missiles are defensive; designed to ensure that India cannot threaten Pakistan with impunity from the Nicobar and Andaman Islands or its long-range nuclear submarines.

Similarly, the deployment of nuclear-capable tactical missiles was in direct response to India’s growing and advanced military deployments and repeated threats to attack Pakistan. (It is similar to Nato’s deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons during the Cold War against the larger conventional forces of the Soviet Union.)

The assertion that Pakistan is “descending into chaos” is palpably false. Today, the politics of the street is over; the economy has stabilised, and a concerted civil-military campaign is under way to combat TTP terrorism and the Baloch insurgents, with the cooperation of the new Afghan government. (Meanwhile, 17 insurgencies simmer within India, unremarked by the Western media.)

The potentially disastrous consequences of the India-Pakistan nuclear and military stand-off cannot be left to be debated in the news media. But India refuses to discuss this seriously.

Under the circumstances, it would be wise for Pakistan to ask the US: if India indeed threatens to launch an attack against Pakistan after a ‘terrorist’ incident, will the US intervene to prevent the conflict, or to prevent Pakistan from resorting to nuclear deterrence?

The central question which Pakistan must pose to the world is: if the aim is to prevent a South Asian catastrophe, is it not better for the world powers to promote an equitable solution to the Kashmir dispute and an agreement on mutual military restraint between Pakistan and India?

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, April 12th, 2015

After Iran, Pakistan? - Newspaper - DAWN.COM