Srinivas
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Afghanistan beyond 2014: What should India do?
The Afghan political landscape is set to change with the withdrawal of the US forces and the inevitable drawdown of financial aid and technical assistance. Based on current developments, here are the four most-realistic political and economic outcomes of the transition process:
First, large swathes along the Durand Line could be ‘Talibanised’, i e most districts in these regions could come under some degree of, if not outright, control of the Taliban. The Pashtun belt could be contested between the Taliban and the commanders in the South. In the rest of the country, fault lines may develop, not just on ethnicity but also, geography and material interests.
Second, there is likely to be competition over dwindling sources of revenue. The new sources are likely to be customs, rent from US bases and poppy. Four provinces (Kandahar, Nangarhar, Balkh and Herat) are crucial for customs revenues. The south and the south-west regions include key poppy-growing provinces. Economically, these provinces- some of which are likely to be under Taliban control – will become important. Local power dynamics are likely to evolve as new players emerge out of competition over limited resources.
Third, regional actors will determine whether such competition will spill over into other parts of Afghanistan. If Pakistan continues to extend significant support to the Taliban – a most likely scenario – and the Taliban extend their writ from the Pashtun belt to Kabul or Herat, it would escalate hostilities that would transcend ethnic allegiances. Local commanders would then cut deals for their own survival unless an outside actor is willing to underwrite their fight.
Fourth, the Afghan Presidential election is to be held in 2014. At the moment, there is no outright favourite nor a consensus figure. Any candidate will need some form of US backing – either outright support or not being opposed. However, the process will need to be transparent and inclusive. No amount of US troops after 2014 would be of use if the election is not held, held badly or if an attempt is made to impose a leader. If the election is seen by a majority – mostly by those in the Pashtun belt – as reasonably fair, and as long as there is a certain US presence on the ground, it is unlikely that there would be an all-out civil war. The Taliban are also unlikely to sweep as they did in 1995-97, at least, not in the next two to three years.
What’s at stake?
There is no consensus in the West on what constitutes the ‘end-state’ in Afghanistan. This inadequacy has impacted on state-building efforts and is likely to aggravate the post-2014 situation. Nothing underscores this more than the lack of incentives by the West to induce a change in Pakistan’s policy of supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan. For the West, Pakistan, its nukes and jihadis are far more of a concern than Afghanistan’s transition into a politically and economically stable state. Concerns about terrorism continue to drive western intelligence agencies to retain their liaison relationship, no matter how dysfunctional, with the ISI. This results in the appeasement of the very actors that the international community fought during the last 11 years. That appeasement has led the US and Kabul to try and open doors for the Taliban to return to Kabul. A return of the Taliban would lead to a resurgence of international terrorism, increased poppy cultivation and would limit access to Afghanistan’s mineral resources. The Central Asian states would inevitably close their borders not only putting an end to plans for a New Silk route but also in accessing the abundant oil and gas reserves there.
Pakistan’s interests Several reasons motivate Pakistan’s support for the insurgency. Apart from the obvious one – to thwart an Indian footprint, the one which has been ignored is that Pakistan has its own hegemonic designs. Over the years, the ‘deep state’ has used many arguments – a federation, strategic depth, fusion, etc to assert a claim, or a right, to dictate terms over Afghanistan. It has provided the Taliban external sanctuaries and built up the obscurantist forces that the West was striving to replace. Consequently, local governance in Afghanistan remains inadequate and war rages on. As Pakistan seeks to assert itself, there is growing anti-Pak sentiment within Afghanistan – nowhere is Pakistan detested more than in Afghanistan.
The economy will be a crucial issue in the post 2014 period and could contract. Pakistan does not have the economic depth to offer any hope to Afghanistan. Poppy has always been an easy remedy and, in the event of a loosening of central control in Kabul, this scourge will reappear and fuel terrorism.
India’s interests
India’s position has been that we want a “peaceful, stable, pluralistic and democratic” Afghanistan, but this is more of a political slogan than a strategy. Our policy should be guided by our interests.
1) The first relates to our security concerns. Afghanistan was used as a base for anti-India activities during the Taliban regime, including the hijacking of IC 814. There are worrying signs that the Lashkar-e-Taiba has been active in eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban’s return would be a setback to efforts against global terrorism as groups like al-Qaeda, which thrive on tribal networks forged over decades of investment in personal relationships, will waste no time in relocating to Afghanistan.
It is in India’s interest to help the Afghans assume ownership of their future. For this, we need to support the ANSF to develop its capability to effectively counter the Taliban. The multi-ethnic ANSF is also a bulwark against a splintering along ethnic lines. If it were to fragment, war-lords and local militia will emerge which may result in internal displacement and a refugee crisis. It is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to absorb more refugees and the West is too weary to counter the human rights violations which could follow.
2) Second, a fragmented Northern Alliance would not be able to stand up to the Taliban. India and the NA – comprising Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and some anti-Taliban Pashtoons – share a common vision for Afghanistan. India had played a role in keeping the NA, then the de-facto military wing of the Rabbani government that India recognized, afloat and preventing the Taliban from sweeping Afghanistan. While largely unacknowledged, these efforts paid off, for we must remember that the US ground operations were launched with only 100 CIA officers and 350 US Special Forces soldiers. Partnering them was the NA force of 15,000 that braved the actual fighting.
Regardless of the scope of western engagement in Afghanistan after 2014 and the nature of political settlement with the Taliban, the NA is indispensably important to Afghanistan’s future and to addressing India’s security concerns. It would be in India’s interest to help the NA reconfigure itself as a political block that would be better positioned for the future. India needs to ensure that the NA is appropriately represented in any future settlement. Empowering the NA is complementary to strengthening the ANSF. While we support Afghanistan’s democratic consolidation through assistance with institutional development, elections, security, etc. we also need to support the NA and ensure that they play a positive role in legitimately and democratically contesting for power in Afghanistan. The election next year is crucial. India should support a process that is transparent, legitimate and inclusive. Whatever its private preferences, it should not be seen to favor a candidate but let the Afghans choose one. Goodwill is our biggest source of strength – we should invest in sustaining it.
Seeing beyond the curve
There is an acute need to counter the narrative that seems to be gaining ground that India is risk-averse with no staying power and that it is too engaged with its relationship with Pakistan to see beyond the curve. Some Afghans have been saying that India is worried of a Pakistani backlash if it gets too pro-active in Afghanistan while others say its interests are confined to countering Pakistan and that Afghanistan is secondary. India needs to clearly signal that we unreservedly support the Afghan people’s ownership of the future. India needs to give teeth to the Strategic Partnership Accord. India’s engagement in Afghanistan is an expression of its rising economic profile and a commitment to development in the region. Apart from wanting to play a greater role in the region, India now has, unlike in the early 1990’s, the means to pursue such goals. After investing an unprecedented amount of resources in a government and people who draw more inspiration from its model of governance and society than with any other country in the region, it is not in India’s interest to take a backseat.
Read more at: http://www.firstpost.com/world/afghanistan-beyond-2014-what-should-india-do-1203889.html/2?utm_source=ref_article
And this proves that Indian so-called cries about "Terrorism" were all hogwash .
