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A research paper published by Lowy Institute has claimed that Chinese and Indian ballistic missile submarines are not yet technologically advanced enough and too few in number to provide their respective countries with an invulnerable nuclear arsenal that would deter an aggressor from launching a nuclear attack for fear of retaliation.
While U.S. and Soviet missile-carrying ballistic submarines (SSBNs) with their invulnerable second-strike capability have helped maintain nuclear deterrence – and as a consequence peace – during the Cold War, Chinese and Indian subs in Asian waters today could trigger instability and conflict for the simple reason that they are just still too easy to detect.
The Chinese Type 094 Jin-class SSBN–“China’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent,” according to the Pentagon—is allegedly easier to detect than Soviet SSBNs from the late 1970s. Conversely, the acoustic signature of India’s Arihant-class SSBN “is not likely to be quieter than China’s Jin-class boats” the study notes.
Additionally, New Delhi faces the problem that its K-15 ballistic missiles purportedly only have a range of 750km, which means that Indian SSBNs have to cross busy maritime chokepoints to patrol along China’s coastline making them, in turn, more vulnerable to detection.
On top of that, lack of proper training and doctrine in addition to inadequate command and control systems adds to the unpredictability of Chinese and Indian ballistic missile subs and can furthermore contribute to uncertainty during times of crisis.
Reference:- How China and India’s Noisy Nuclear Subs Contribute to Instability in Asia | The Diplomat
Observations on India / Arihant-class SSBN -
INDIA
India’s nuclear forces are in the midst of extensive modernisation. Despite confident rhetoric about the quality of India’s deterrent, it remains uncertain whether India has a reliable second-strike capability against its two potential adversaries, China and Pakistan. It is widely assumed that India’s land-based missiles, often with shorter ranges, are intended to deter a nuclear-armed Pakistan, whereas the submarine program is aimed at giving India confidence that it will not be coerced by China. Some of India’s land-based weapons, notably long-range variants of the Agni missile, are also believed to be designed to target China, but submarines will increase India’s confidence that it could retaliate if struck first.
Test flights of Indian ballistic missiles are becoming commonplace. It is possible that in 2015 India will conduct the first test-firing of a ballistic missile — the B-05 or K-15 — from a submerged Indian submarine. This would be the next step in advancing India’s long-held ambition to achieve a ‘triad’ of land-, air- and sea-launched nuclear weapons. A previous milestone in this program was the launch in 2009 of New Delhi’s first SSBN, the INS Arihant. A second such submarine is being built — potentially to be put to sea within the next year or two — and a third and possibly fourth are also planned. There are reports that in the medium term, an updated design is planned for India’s fifth SSBN, which will be larger and contain a more powerful reactor, allowing longer-range patrols.
There are conflicting accounts of whether India intends the Arihant to be merely a technology demonstrator or an operational weapons-carrying platform. In 2010 Indian media reported the then Indian Naval Chief as suggesting that K-15 ballistic missiles would be paired with the vessel from about 2016. However, there has been some speculation that since the vessel is partly based on the old Akula-class Soviet SSN, and because it is India’s first indigenously designed nuclear submarine, its acoustic signature is not likely to be quieter than China’s Jin-class boats. In other words, both India and China will initially have nuclear-armed submarines that are relatively easy for potential adversaries to track.
The shortcomings of the K-15 SLBM are a major limitation on India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. The range of the K-15 is believed to be just 750 km, meaning that Indian vessels would have to patrol dangerously close to the Chinese or Pakistani coasts. In terms of India’s deterrent against China, a vessel equipped with the K-15 would have to transit busy choke points such as the Straits of Malacca or Sunda and loiter off the Chinese coastline, thereby running a high risk of being detected by China’s fast-improving surveillance and anti-access forces and being pre-emptively attacked in a crisis. The nature of the Soviet-designed nuclear reactor on board, with a short refuelling cycle, could also limit the length and frequency of patrols.
New Delhi is trying to address these shortcomings by developing submarine-launched missiles with longer ranges: the K-4 (3000 km range) underwent an undersea test launch (from a pontoon not a submarine) in early 2015 and the K-5 (5000 km range) is reportedly in the design phase. It is unclear whether these larger missiles would fit into the Arihant class, or whether they will only be compatible with an updated Indian SSBN design. It is possible that Indian submarines will end up carrying up to twelve K-15 missiles each, or a smaller number, perhaps four, of the long-range missiles.
Research Paper - Nuclear-armed submarines in Indo-Pacific Asia: Stabiliser or menace?
Here's a comparative analysis of acoustic signatures of various nuclear submarines as per the US Naval Intelligence -
Since Arihant's design is based on the Russian Akula-1 Class submarine - is it safe to assume that it's acoustic signature will be similar to Akula-1 Class? and what are its implications? @AUSTERLITZ @MilSpec @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @Technogaianist
While U.S. and Soviet missile-carrying ballistic submarines (SSBNs) with their invulnerable second-strike capability have helped maintain nuclear deterrence – and as a consequence peace – during the Cold War, Chinese and Indian subs in Asian waters today could trigger instability and conflict for the simple reason that they are just still too easy to detect.
The Chinese Type 094 Jin-class SSBN–“China’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent,” according to the Pentagon—is allegedly easier to detect than Soviet SSBNs from the late 1970s. Conversely, the acoustic signature of India’s Arihant-class SSBN “is not likely to be quieter than China’s Jin-class boats” the study notes.
Additionally, New Delhi faces the problem that its K-15 ballistic missiles purportedly only have a range of 750km, which means that Indian SSBNs have to cross busy maritime chokepoints to patrol along China’s coastline making them, in turn, more vulnerable to detection.
On top of that, lack of proper training and doctrine in addition to inadequate command and control systems adds to the unpredictability of Chinese and Indian ballistic missile subs and can furthermore contribute to uncertainty during times of crisis.
Reference:- How China and India’s Noisy Nuclear Subs Contribute to Instability in Asia | The Diplomat
Observations on India / Arihant-class SSBN -
INDIA
India’s nuclear forces are in the midst of extensive modernisation. Despite confident rhetoric about the quality of India’s deterrent, it remains uncertain whether India has a reliable second-strike capability against its two potential adversaries, China and Pakistan. It is widely assumed that India’s land-based missiles, often with shorter ranges, are intended to deter a nuclear-armed Pakistan, whereas the submarine program is aimed at giving India confidence that it will not be coerced by China. Some of India’s land-based weapons, notably long-range variants of the Agni missile, are also believed to be designed to target China, but submarines will increase India’s confidence that it could retaliate if struck first.
Test flights of Indian ballistic missiles are becoming commonplace. It is possible that in 2015 India will conduct the first test-firing of a ballistic missile — the B-05 or K-15 — from a submerged Indian submarine. This would be the next step in advancing India’s long-held ambition to achieve a ‘triad’ of land-, air- and sea-launched nuclear weapons. A previous milestone in this program was the launch in 2009 of New Delhi’s first SSBN, the INS Arihant. A second such submarine is being built — potentially to be put to sea within the next year or two — and a third and possibly fourth are also planned. There are reports that in the medium term, an updated design is planned for India’s fifth SSBN, which will be larger and contain a more powerful reactor, allowing longer-range patrols.
There are conflicting accounts of whether India intends the Arihant to be merely a technology demonstrator or an operational weapons-carrying platform. In 2010 Indian media reported the then Indian Naval Chief as suggesting that K-15 ballistic missiles would be paired with the vessel from about 2016. However, there has been some speculation that since the vessel is partly based on the old Akula-class Soviet SSN, and because it is India’s first indigenously designed nuclear submarine, its acoustic signature is not likely to be quieter than China’s Jin-class boats. In other words, both India and China will initially have nuclear-armed submarines that are relatively easy for potential adversaries to track.
The shortcomings of the K-15 SLBM are a major limitation on India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. The range of the K-15 is believed to be just 750 km, meaning that Indian vessels would have to patrol dangerously close to the Chinese or Pakistani coasts. In terms of India’s deterrent against China, a vessel equipped with the K-15 would have to transit busy choke points such as the Straits of Malacca or Sunda and loiter off the Chinese coastline, thereby running a high risk of being detected by China’s fast-improving surveillance and anti-access forces and being pre-emptively attacked in a crisis. The nature of the Soviet-designed nuclear reactor on board, with a short refuelling cycle, could also limit the length and frequency of patrols.
New Delhi is trying to address these shortcomings by developing submarine-launched missiles with longer ranges: the K-4 (3000 km range) underwent an undersea test launch (from a pontoon not a submarine) in early 2015 and the K-5 (5000 km range) is reportedly in the design phase. It is unclear whether these larger missiles would fit into the Arihant class, or whether they will only be compatible with an updated Indian SSBN design. It is possible that Indian submarines will end up carrying up to twelve K-15 missiles each, or a smaller number, perhaps four, of the long-range missiles.
Research Paper - Nuclear-armed submarines in Indo-Pacific Asia: Stabiliser or menace?
Here's a comparative analysis of acoustic signatures of various nuclear submarines as per the US Naval Intelligence -
Since Arihant's design is based on the Russian Akula-1 Class submarine - is it safe to assume that it's acoustic signature will be similar to Akula-1 Class? and what are its implications? @AUSTERLITZ @MilSpec @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @Technogaianist
. She's a Virginia Class
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