A Dogfight over Delhi

[MINK]

A Dogfight over Delhi: Rafale vs Typhoon

Sir Stephen Dalton, the UK’s chief of air staff, hurtled down the runway behind the controls of a Russian-designed Sukhoi-30 at the Kalaikunda air base in West Bengal. The deafening roar of the engines of the mainstay of the Indian air force swept over a small band of observers gathered just over a year ago in the rising tropical heat.
Minutes later, a Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon built by a British, German, Italian and Spanish consortium took to the skies as part of a staged dogfight with India’s French Mirages and Russian aircraft, designed to impress officials seeking to modernise an ageing fleet. Its near-vertical take-off was met with awed admiration.

Within the sights of Sir Stephen, a veteran of the first Gulf war – as well as his political masters and hundreds of aerospace executives – was one of the world’s most sought-after jet fighter contracts. London, Paris and Washington were all vying to re-equip the world’s largest democracy with 126 fighters – about one-10th of the force – seeing it as a chance to put a seal on a defining bilateral relationship of the 21st century.
Worth up to $20bn, the deal to supply India – with its fast-growing economy and geopolitical status, and concern about the threat from Pakistan to the north and China to the east – offered a European defence establishment suffering shrinking military budgets back home the chance to reshape the industry landscape.

But the mock battle was the closest the Typhoon came to the target. New Delhi last week chose Dassault’s Rafale over the Eurofighter at the end of an eight-year competition. The significance of the agreement is being compared to that of the UK’s record al-Yamama deal with Saudi Arabia, signed in the 1980s. Optimists say it could be signed within eight months, joining a $9.3bn agreement for France to supply India with two nuclear plants and another to build it a modern conventional submarine fleet worth $4bn.
“This is a major win for France, and a major loss for the UK ... French political backing has been essential in strengthening the French bid and the Rafale win is therefore also a major victory for President Nicolas Sarkozy,” says Endre Lunde, an aerospace and defence consultant at IHS Jane’s, a defence consultancy.
Rafale’s selection is a bitter disappointment for all four nations in the consortium, and highlights Indian doubts about a pan-European partnership at a time of financial and political strain on the continent.
It has a particular sting for David Cameron. The UK prime minister identified the Indian market as one of the most important for Britain’s exporters – but this opening gambit to his premiership has shown scant return even though accompanied by £1bn of aid in the next four years.
The decision also deals a blow to Mr Cameron’s attempt to style himself a champion of trade missions led by the private sector – unlike France’s dirigiste approach – and of Britain’s dwindling manufacturing base.
Eurofighter’s backers thought it the lead contender, bringing more advanced technology and strategic clout than the Rafale, which had not been sold outside France. Their confidence soared after US rivals – Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Super Viper – were knocked out of the highly secretive medium multi-role combat aircraft contest last year.

In London and Berlin, contractors salivated at the idea of harnessing via industrial partnership a greater share of India’s $36bn annual defence budget – one of the world’s largest, and probably a third of China’s. A big European purchase would shift India away from reliance on Russia and show the US was not the only alternative as Delhi sought to rearm itself in light of mounting concerns about a more assertive Beijing.
The executives of the consortium partners were convinced Eurofighter offered a superior so-called “4th generation” aircraft suited to aerial combat and able to strike targets on the ground. They were also confident they had priced it competitively, in spite of some analysts’ claims that the Rafale was up to 10 per cent cheaper.
But they overlooked Indian misgivings about security of supply for an aircraft built by four countries across a continent in financial turmoil and amid worries about the aircraft’s radar capabilities. “The upside is that Eurofighter delivers you four countries as strategic partners,” says Douglas Barrie of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, but “the down side is they have to negotiate with each other before they negotiate with you”.
. . .
They also underestimated the government-to-government nature of India’s arms dealings; its deep-seated fears over its energy vulnerabilities; and its hunt for a bargain. “Patience is a key aspect of doing business in India, as is price,” says Gunjan Bagla of California-based Amritt Inc, an advisory service. “The Indian approach is that so long as a product meets the minimum threshold of performance, then it seeks the best value for money. This should come as no surprise.”
Eurofighter executives want a “detailed explanation” from India’s Ministry of Defence of how calculations were made. They doubt that Dassault, which conducted its campaign from within the grey concrete walls of the French embassy, can deliver on its promises in terms of price and schedule.
Meantime, there is grim denial that the contest is over, and that India has overlooked a partnership that they say includes two of the more robust European economies, Germany and the UK, in favour of one with a country recently stripped of its triple A credit status. One veteran of the Eurofighter campaign vows not to give up until India makes the first downpayment to the French, which might not be for years, claiming that arms deals of this magnitude are in play “until money is in the bank”. BAE, one of the Eurofighter group partners, yesterday signalled that it was prepared to drop the price.

Triumph of versatility on display in the skies over Libya

Within the UK defence industry the Indian fighter-jet tender was seen as Eurofighter’s to lose, writes Carola Hoyos. The Typhoon was seen as technologically superior, more thoroughly tested by several national air forces, and came with the political clout of four European governments – Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain.
But analysts who studied the relative technical abilities of the two jets were not so sure. “Any suggestion that Rafale is a poor cousin to Typhoon is an oversimplification,” says Douglas Barrie of the IISS, a London-based think-tank. “The gap between the two aircraft is not very big at all.”
Both jets were conceived in the early 1980s when the demand was for jet fighters that could, in true “Top Gun” style, shoot Soviet aircraft out of the sky. Since then – as shown in campaigns from Serbia to Iraq and Afghanistan – air-to-ground combat has become far more important. The question has been how quickly jets such as the Typhoon and Rafale could be turned into more versatile fighters.
The answer, say analysts, came in the Libyan conflict. The Rafale, which has a larger array of air-to-ground weapons, was able to strike moving targets on the ground and fight incoming fire. For all its nimbleness, the Typhoon could only drop larger weapons, creating more collateral damage.
Radar was another consideration. Neither Typhoon nor Rafale has the most modern system available, though both camps are working on it.
In fact, the only really advanced radar systems available are those made by the US. Analysts say that the fact India discarded a US option suggests the political willingness of a partner to supply future weapons and systems upgrades, regardless of politics, is of key importance. Similarly, industry experts say that the shortcomings of the Typhoon’s weapons systems exposed in Libya could be fixed – if the political will and funding is there.
The question within the Typhoon camp is whether there was anything other than a lower price that the French offered. That concern among senior members of the Eurofighter team was fuelled when – most unusually – New Delhi did not come back with technical follow-up questions to their offer. Others, however, say the Eurofighter team simply mishandled the bid, focusing too narrowly on technical details.

Delhi’s version of events is that, in an era of corruption scandals and an activist Supreme Court, it has played the selection process entirely by the book. Defence officials say that, once the two models passed technical trials, the deciding factor was always going to be which was offered at the lowest price. They say the choice of Rafale, which some say came in $5m cheaper per aircraft, was one of the cleanest decisions in India’s arms procurement history, with the minimum of political interference.
Defence experts, however, say other factors came into play in the form of investment agreements, whereby they were required to invest half the value of the contract back into India, and technology transfer. “The deal is beyond the aircraft,” says Uday Bhaskar, a Delhi-based defence analyst. “If I was in the shoes of France looking at India, I would go beyond the fighter to the next big-ticket items of civil nuclear power and the [nuclear] submarine arena.”
Bharat Karnad, a defence expert at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi, says a likely bargaining chip was the prospect of the use of nuclear testing facilities in Bordeaux to shore up the thermonuclear shortcomings of India’s nuclear arsenal. Such collaboration would give them more confidence in their own deterrent in the long-running standoff with nuclear-armed Pakistan. “The Indian government can’t be blamed for misleading anyone. It was government-to-government from the very beginning.We wanted to know what things we would get with the fighter,” he says.
Competitors suspect the nuclear element played a part in the decision. “Dassault got very aggressive on price and then Sarkozy rounded out the deal at the very end, possibly with some side-deal involving nuclear energy,” one German official says.
Mr Sarkozy, months away from a presidential election that promises to be a bitter fight, and Dassault are quietly triumphant. He has underlined his determination by saying the final negotiations had “the full support of the French authorities” and would include technology transfers “guaranteed” by the state.
Two years ago, even sceptical senior Indian diplomats expressed pleasure at a visit by Mr Sarkozy that placed nuclear energy at the centre of French engagement. Mr Sarkozy appeared determined to leverage the loyalty Paris earned in 1998 by not showing opprobrium at Delhi’s nuclear tests, which circumvented the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
More recently, stalled deals in Brazil and the United Arab Emirates had put Dassault under intense pressure to give the Indians an attractive price, particularly on the lifetime cost of supporting and upgrading the aircraft. Gérard Longuet, defence minister, threatened to end Rafale production unless a foreign sale was secured.
“Sarko is willing to give them whatever [technology] they want,” says a French defence industry executive. “It’s fair to say the technology has been around a while now so is not quite leading-edge. Remember we were talking about selling the Rafale to [Muammer] Gaddafi in Libya, so there are no qualms really.”
Internal critiques on how the deal was lost will almost certainly heap blame on Germany – and, in some quarters, deepen existing regret that the UK, India’s former colonial master, did not take the lead role in a more dynamic bid.
The German-led bid was excessively technical and lacked glossy display of what the Typhoon could do in conflicts, according to one critic. While Dassault's bid was captured in 20 pages, Eurofighter’s ran to 150.
“The German government was very German. It helped as best it thought it could,” explains one Berlin official. “But it was always trammelled by German public aversion to arms sales, and by the fact that it doesn’t pursue a statist industrial policy like Paris ... The fact that some countries do packages and the Germans don’t is a fact you have to accept.”
Yet the most outspoken criticism has come from analysts who believe that India should leap straight to 5th generation “stealth” fighters with Russian Pak-Fa and American F-35 and F-22 fighters.
“It’s a terrible deal,” says Ajai Shukla, defence columnist for India’s Business Standard newspaper and a fierce critic of India’s sluggish procurement processes.
“The air force has been tempted into buying an outdated fighter. We should be matching our capabilities against China. Our military advantage over China is our air power.”


A dogfight over Delhi - FT.com

 

[Mblaze]

A Dogfight over Delhi: Rafale vs Typhoon

Sir Stephen Dalton, the UK’s chief of air staff, hurtled down the runway behind the controls of a Russian-designed Sukhoi-30 at the Kalaikunda air base in West Bengal. The deafening roar of the engines of the mainstay of the Indian air force swept over a small band of observers gathered just over a year ago in the rising tropical heat.
Minutes later, a Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon built by a British, German, Italian and Spanish consortium took to the skies as part of a staged dogfight with India’s French Mirages and Russian aircraft, designed to impress officials seeking to modernise an ageing fleet. Its near-vertical take-off was met with awed admiration.

Within the sights of Sir Stephen, a veteran of the first Gulf war – as well as his political masters and hundreds of aerospace executives – was one of the world’s most sought-after jet fighter contracts. London, Paris and Washington were all vying to re-equip the world’s largest democracy with 126 fighters – about one-10th of the force – seeing it as a chance to put a seal on a defining bilateral relationship of the 21st century.
Worth up to $20bn, the deal to supply India – with its fast-growing economy and geopolitical status, and concern about the threat from Pakistan to the north and China to the east – offered a European defence establishment suffering shrinking military budgets back home the chance to reshape the industry landscape.

But the mock battle was the closest the Typhoon came to the target. New Delhi last week chose Dassault’s Rafale over the Eurofighter at the end of an eight-year competition. The significance of the agreement is being compared to that of the UK’s record al-Yamama deal with Saudi Arabia, signed in the 1980s. Optimists say it could be signed within eight months, joining a $9.3bn agreement for France to supply India with two nuclear plants and another to build it a modern conventional submarine fleet worth $4bn.
“This is a major win for France, and a major loss for the UK ... French political backing has been essential in strengthening the French bid and the Rafale win is therefore also a major victory for President Nicolas Sarkozy,” says Endre Lunde, an aerospace and defence consultant at IHS Jane’s, a defence consultancy.
Rafale’s selection is a bitter disappointment for all four nations in the consortium, and highlights Indian doubts about a pan-European partnership at a time of financial and political strain on the continent.
It has a particular sting for David Cameron. The UK prime minister identified the Indian market as one of the most important for Britain’s exporters – but this opening gambit to his premiership has shown scant return even though accompanied by £1bn of aid in the next four years.
The decision also deals a blow to Mr Cameron’s attempt to style himself a champion of trade missions led by the private sector – unlike France’s dirigiste approach – and of Britain’s dwindling manufacturing base.
Eurofighter’s backers thought it the lead contender, bringing more advanced technology and strategic clout than the Rafale, which had not been sold outside France. Their confidence soared after US rivals – Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Super Viper – were knocked out of the highly secretive medium multi-role combat aircraft contest last year.

In London and Berlin, contractors salivated at the idea of harnessing via industrial partnership a greater share of India’s $36bn annual defence budget – one of the world’s largest, and probably a third of China’s. A big European purchase would shift India away from reliance on Russia and show the US was not the only alternative as Delhi sought to rearm itself in light of mounting concerns about a more assertive Beijing.
The executives of the consortium partners were convinced Eurofighter offered a superior so-called “4th generation” aircraft suited to aerial combat and able to strike targets on the ground. They were also confident they had priced it competitively, in spite of some analysts’ claims that the Rafale was up to 10 per cent cheaper.
But they overlooked Indian misgivings about security of supply for an aircraft built by four countries across a continent in financial turmoil and amid worries about the aircraft’s radar capabilities. “The upside is that Eurofighter delivers you four countries as strategic partners,” says Douglas Barrie of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, but “the down side is they have to negotiate with each other before they negotiate with you”.
. . .
They also underestimated the government-to-government nature of India’s arms dealings; its deep-seated fears over its energy vulnerabilities; and its hunt for a bargain. “Patience is a key aspect of doing business in India, as is price,” says Gunjan Bagla of California-based Amritt Inc, an advisory service. “The Indian approach is that so long as a product meets the minimum threshold of performance, then it seeks the best value for money. This should come as no surprise.”
Eurofighter executives want a “detailed explanation” from India’s Ministry of Defence of how calculations were made. They doubt that Dassault, which conducted its campaign from within the grey concrete walls of the French embassy, can deliver on its promises in terms of price and schedule.
Meantime, there is grim denial that the contest is over, and that India has overlooked a partnership that they say includes two of the more robust European economies, Germany and the UK, in favour of one with a country recently stripped of its triple A credit status. One veteran of the Eurofighter campaign vows not to give up until India makes the first downpayment to the French, which might not be for years, claiming that arms deals of this magnitude are in play “until money is in the bank”. BAE, one of the Eurofighter group partners, yesterday signalled that it was prepared to drop the price.



Delhi’s version of events is that, in an era of corruption scandals and an activist Supreme Court, it has played the selection process entirely by the book. Defence officials say that, once the two models passed technical trials, the deciding factor was always going to be which was offered at the lowest price. They say the choice of Rafale, which some say came in $5m cheaper per aircraft, was one of the cleanest decisions in India’s arms procurement history, with the minimum of political interference.
Defence experts, however, say other factors came into play in the form of investment agreements, whereby they were required to invest half the value of the contract back into India, and technology transfer. “The deal is beyond the aircraft,” says Uday Bhaskar, a Delhi-based defence analyst. “If I was in the shoes of France looking at India, I would go beyond the fighter to the next big-ticket items of civil nuclear power and the [nuclear] submarine arena.”
Bharat Karnad, a defence expert at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi, says a likely bargaining chip was the prospect of the use of nuclear testing facilities in Bordeaux to shore up the thermonuclear shortcomings of India’s nuclear arsenal.

Such collaboration would give them more confidence in their own deterrent in the long-running standoff with nuclear-armed Pakistan. “The Indian government can’t be blamed for misleading anyone. It was government-to-government from the very beginning.We wanted to know what things we would get with the fighter,” he says.

Competitors suspect the nuclear element played a part in the decision. “Dassault got very aggressive on price and then Sarkozy rounded out the deal at the very end, possibly with some side-deal involving nuclear energy,” one German official says.
Mr Sarkozy, months away from a presidential election that promises to be a bitter fight, and Dassault are quietly triumphant. He has underlined his determination by saying the final negotiations had “the full support of the French authorities” and would include technology transfers “guaranteed” by the state.
Two years ago, even sceptical senior Indian diplomats expressed pleasure at a visit by Mr Sarkozy that placed nuclear energy at the centre of French engagement. Mr Sarkozy appeared determined to leverage the loyalty Paris earned in 1998 by not showing opprobrium at Delhi’s nuclear tests, which circumvented the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
More recently, stalled deals in Brazil and the United Arab Emirates had put Dassault under intense pressure to give the Indians an attractive price, particularly on the lifetime cost of supporting and upgrading the aircraft. Gérard Longuet, defence minister, threatened to end Rafale production unless a foreign sale was secured.
“Sarko is willing to give them whatever [technology] they want,” says a French defence industry executive. “It’s fair to say the technology has been around a while now so is not quite leading-edge. Remember we were talking about selling the Rafale to [Muammer] Gaddafi in Libya, so there are no qualms really.”
Internal critiques on how the deal was lost will almost certainly heap blame on Germany – and, in some quarters, deepen existing regret that the UK, India’s former colonial master, did not take the lead role in a more dynamic bid.
The German-led bid was excessively technical and lacked glossy display of what the Typhoon could do in conflicts, according to one critic. While Dassault's bid was captured in 20 pages, Eurofighter’s ran to 150.
“The German government was very German. It helped as best it thought it could,” explains one Berlin official. “But it was always trammelled by German public aversion to arms sales, and by the fact that it doesn’t pursue a statist industrial policy like Paris ... The fact that some countries do packages and the Germans don’t is a fact you have to accept.”
Yet the most outspoken criticism has come from analysts who believe that India should leap straight to 5th generation “stealth” fighters with Russian Pak-Fa and American F-35 and F-22 fighters.
“It’s a terrible deal,” says Ajai Shukla, defence columnist for India’s Business Standard newspaper and a fierce critic of India’s sluggish procurement processes.
“The air force has been tempted into buying an outdated fighter. We should be matching our capabilities against China. Our military advantage over China is our air power.”


A dogfight over Delhi - FT.com

Interesting points.

 

[indushek]

Yes the thing about Bordeaux is really really interesting.

 

[Bang Galore]

The more information seeps out, the more I am convinced that GoI handled this procurement beautifully. I must admit that even though I was not a early cheerleader for Rafale like some here & was originally partial to the SH & then to the EF, I am now convinced that we have done the right thing here. I'm also more convinced than ever that other variables other than cost & performance were at play here & GoI probably did a great job on squeezing out the last drops of juice on this deal.

 

[Bang Galore]

An American perspective:

How Do You Say "Top Gun" in French?

Take that, Anglo-Americains!

Michael Moran

Americans may have missed the Euro-kerfuffle that India started last week by choosing the French Dassault Rafale fighter over the Eurofighter Typhoon, produced by a British-led consortium that had acted as if the $20 billion order—and the resulting influence on an important rising power— was a sure-fire thing.

The decision by India late last week had British Prime Minister David Cameron particularly incensed because he insisted that the consortium that produces Eurofighter press its case separate of any other government promises of aid or future technology transfers. The French, of course, have never believed in doing anything for the sake of “Anglo”-style capitalist principle, and they promptly bagged the lucrative contract by packaging the already less expensive warplane with a $9.3 billion deal for two nuclear power stations and a nearly sealed contract to build diesel submarines for India. This is the dead hand of the state at its dirigiste best.

There could be something to Cameron's moans—on paper (and probably in the air, too) the Typhoon is a superior aircraft, if slightly more expensive. But Cameron’s insistence that India review its decision looks a lot like sour grapes; nothing's fair in war and arms sales. Still, the British media responded with the usual hackneyed clichés about the duplicitous French and the lack of tact and savvy displayed by Germans (who led the Eurofighter bid). The FT produced an admirable recounting of the competition, along with some analysis of what it means longer-term for European arms manufacturers (ex-France) given the chronic decline of their national budgets.

To my mind, though, the missing question—and forgive the parochialism here—is whether this competition would have played out completely differently had the Obama administration put America’s best foot forward. In an earlier round of this Spenglerian beauty context, the U.S.-built F-15 and F/A-18, which first flew in the 1970s, both got the thumbs down from India’s air chiefs (along with the Swedish Saab Grippen and Russia’s MiG-35).

This put Russian, Swedish, and American noses out of joint, of course. But at least the Russians and the Swedes entered their latest models. Would the competition had gone differently—along with the $20 billion in manufacturing jobs—had the F-35 Lightning II been the American entry?

I think so. Indeed, some analysts have argued that the F/A-18 probably outperforms any of the aircraft listed above, but that India’s air chiefs felt snubbed by the decision (made during the Bush administration and reaffirmed by Obama officials) not to offer the best export version of the F-35 to a country that the United States has been wooing for the past decade like a drunken freshman at his first mixer.

The F-35 Lightning has already been sold to Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the British (for the Royal Navy). Under what bizarre scenario did the U.S. military foresee its sale to India posing a threat to American national security? Pakistani sensibilities? If nothing else, the additional aircraft on the production lines might have helped bring down the ridiculous price of the F-35 program over time (though, admittedly, this could also have sunk the idea of selling it to India).

The British, at least, can say they tried—hey, we made the playoffs! The U.S. decision to withhold the F-35 was, in British parlance, an “own goal.” Nothing ventured, something lost.

I'd imagine my normally consensus-oriented readers will agree entirely with this analysis. I honestly hope not. I'd love to hear a good argument against entering the F-35. Bombs away!

BTW: In case anyone wondered, “Top Gun” in French, according to various translators, is something like fusil supérieur. But if that’s a mouthful for us ‘merkins, we can just say Rafale. One billion Indians—and $20 billion—can’t all be wrong.

How Do You Say "Top Gun" in French?

 

[indushek]

The more information seeps out, the more I am convinced that GoI handled this procurement beautifully. I must admit that even though I was not a early cheerleader for Rafale like some here & was originally partial to the SH & then to the EF, I am now convinced that we have done the right thing here. I'm also more convinced than ever that other variables other than cost & performance were at play here & GoI probably did a great job on squeezing out the last drops of juice on this deal.

One can say safely, that we were looking for way more than just planes, hmmm...

 

[T90TankGuy]

actually yes they seem to have sought out a strategic partnership of an entirely different variety than the one being offered by the consortium of EF
kudos to the GOI , at lest in this deal they have ensured we have come out winners.