1986: How India and China almost went to war

[Shinigami]

At the end of 1986, India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, which is an area claimed by China but administered by India. The Chinese government proceeded to protest. But the military movements in Tawang, taken in conjunction with this political action were seen as a provocation by the Chinese. In early 1987 Beijing's tone became similar to that of 1962, and with the Indian Army refusing to stand down, Western diplomats predicted war.

The Indian response to the Chinese buildup was Operation Falcon and involved movements across the Sino-Indian border. Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters were used to deploy Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks into North Sikkim in the east and Demchok in the west. These deployments were viewed as particularly threatening by the PLA because they seemed to indicate that India had moved from a strategy of defence in its own territory to that of a larger offensive involving all of Arunachal Pradesh.

The result was a thaw. Indian Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari arrived in Beijing in May 1987 en route to Pyongyang, North Korea. He carried with him messages from Indian leaders that there was no intention on New Delhi's part to aggravate the situation. The first formal flag meeting to discuss “ the freezing of the situation” since 1962, was held on the fifth of August 1987 at Bum La in the aftermath of the Wangdung affair. Both sides decided to take up talks with renewed urgency and the following year, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, returning Zhou Enlai's '60s visit.

Aftermath

Both India and China realised the danger of inadvertent conflict and after initial posturing the decision was made to de-escalate their deployments. The Sumdorong Chu fallout was that India and China decided to restart their dialogue on a new and more urgent basis. After Rajiv Gandhi's September 1988 visit, there was a hiatus of sorts because of political turmoil in India. But finally in 1993, the two countries signed an agreement to ensure peace along the LAC.

The agreement brought in an interesting concept of "mutual and equal" security where thinning of forces was envisaged, based on geographical and logistical considerations. However, its most important element is to have the two sides work out a mutually acceptable Line of Actual Control. As of now the two sides have their own versions of the Line and there are points, especially in the Sikkim-Bhutan-India trijunction, the Sumdorong Chu area and so on where the claims are disputed.

Moral of the story: Never deal with China from a position of weakness

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

At the end of 1986, India granted statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, which is an area claimed by China but administered by India. The Chinese government proceeded to protest. But the military movements in Tawang, taken in conjunction with this political action were seen as a provocation by the Chinese. In early 1987 Beijing's tone became similar to that of 1962, and with the Indian Army refusing to stand down, Western diplomats predicted war.

The Indian response to the Chinese buildup was Operation Falcon and involved movements across the Sino-Indian border. Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters were used to deploy Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks into North Sikkim in the east and Demchok in the west. These deployments were viewed as particularly threatening by the PLA because they seemed to indicate that India had moved from a strategy of defence in its own territory to that of a larger offensive involving all of Arunachal Pradesh.

The result was a thaw. Indian Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari arrived in Beijing in May 1987 en route to Pyongyang, North Korea. He carried with him messages from Indian leaders that there was no intention on New Delhi's part to aggravate the situation. The first formal flag meeting to discuss “ the freezing of the situation” since 1962, was held on the fifth of August 1987 at Bum La in the aftermath of the Wangdung affair. Both sides decided to take up talks with renewed urgency and the following year, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, returning Zhou Enlai's '60s visit.

Aftermath

Both India and China realised the danger of inadvertent conflict and after initial posturing the decision was made to de-escalate their deployments. The Sumdorong Chu fallout was that India and China decided to restart their dialogue on a new and more urgent basis. After Rajiv Gandhi's September 1988 visit, there was a hiatus of sorts because of political turmoil in India. But finally in 1993, the two countries signed an agreement to ensure peace along the LAC.

The agreement brought in an interesting concept of "mutual and equal" security where thinning of forces was envisaged, based on geographical and logistical considerations. However, its most important element is to have the two sides work out a mutually acceptable Line of Actual Control. As of now the two sides have their own versions of the Line and there are points, especially in the Sikkim-Bhutan-India trijunction, the Sumdorong Chu area and so on where the claims are disputed.

Moral of the story: Never deal with China from a position of weakness

nice moral of the story, too bad India's position is deteriorating.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Moral of the story: Never deal with China from a position of weakness

Good point.

But why then, have you allowed your economy to become FOUR times smaller than China's, since 1962?

 

[Shinigami]

nice moral of the story, too bad India's position is deteriorating.

you may be referring to the difference in military power due to china's growing defence budget.

but my point was to show how the chinese were deterred from attacking india as its military had changed from a bumbling brigade armed with sticks and stones in the early 60's to a blitzkreig war machine since the 70s. this makes it almost impossible for the chinese to provoke a war against now as it would be easily repelled.

The london times compared the indian military of 1971 to the nazi war machine

Good point.

But why then, have you allowed your economy to become FOUR times smaller than China's, since 1962?

dear, economy has no role in a short skirmish

its importance comes in an all out war

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

you may be referring to the difference in military power due to china's growing defence budget.

but my point was to show how the chinese were deterred from attacking india as its military had changed from a bumbling brigade armed with sticks and stones in the early 60's to a blitzkreig war machine since the 70s. this makes it almost impossible for the chinese to provoke a war against now as it would be easily repelled.

The london times compared the indian military of 1971 to the nazi war machine

The Nazi war machine lost in the end. The US pulverized them and pissed on their bones. In 1950, Mao made what was considered a mad decision: after diplomacy had failed, he ordered Marshal Peng Dehuai to organize a force to repel invading US/South Korean forces from North Korea. It was a wild success. They were pushed back 400 km, never threatened Chinese borders again, and lost Seoul multiple times.

I just have to say this: don't think too highly of yourself.

 

[Shinigami]

The Nazi war machine lost in the end. The US pulverized them and pissed on their bones. In 1950,

buddy the only reason nazis lost were because they were fighting 6 countries single handedly from both sides

I just have to say this: don't think too highly of yourself.

woah! a chinese advising others on humility thats new

i was just bringing some facts to light

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

dear, economy has no role in a short skirmish

its importance comes in an all out war

The Economy is what allows a powerful military to build up.

Your own Armed Forces have already admitted that there is now no chance of them matching China.

 

[foxbat]

I just have to say this: don't think too highly of yourself.

And likewise

 

[Shinigami]

The Economy is what allows a powerful military to build up.

Your own Armed Forces have already admitted that there is now no chance of them matching China.

economy helps in the build up of navy and air forces, wheras any piss poor economy can easily build big armies.

In the case of India vs China in naval and air platforms, its a classic case of quantity vs quality. c,mon ask me to prove it

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

economy helps in the build up of navy and air forces, wheras any piss poor economy can easily build big armies.

In the case of India vs China in naval and air platforms, its a classic case of quantity vs quality. c,mon ask me to prove it

Sure. Delhi vs. 052C.

 

[joekrish]

Deteriorating? Reboot and check.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

economy helps in the build up of navy and air forces, wheras any piss poor economy can easily build big armies.

In the case of India vs China in naval and air platforms, its a classic case of quantity vs quality. c,mon ask me to prove it

What, has the LCA come out yet?

Also, do you disagree with your own Armed Forces when they say they can't hope to match us?

 

[Kyusuibu Honbu]

Wasn' t this operation checkerboard?

nice moral anyway, applicable to anyone

 

[Shinigami]

What, has the LCA come out yet?

Since when does IAF fleet consist of just LCA? and yeah cleared IOC. babysteps.

Also, do you disagree with your own Armed Forces when they say they can't hope to match us?

quantity-wise? nope. overall? with the right tactics and bit of luck, maybe

besides indian armed forces have a record of having spectacular kill ratios

i can show them to u if u want

 

[fly2012]

Moral of the story: Never deal with China from a position of weakness

Thank you for sharing out this story. But you've reached a wrong conclusion. 1962 happenned because Nehru's aggressiveness on personally supporting Dalai Lama and implementing forward policy. It is the exact opposite of your conclusion, Nehru thought China was too weak and could not do anything.

I think Moral of the story: Let cool heads manage the countries and always prefer dialog first.