16th December 1971: From East Pakistan to Bangladesh

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INDEPENDENCE DAY SPECIAL 2015
The Tangail Landings: A signal for victory
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Dr. Nuran Nabi (extreme right)

Dr. Nuran Nabi
I travelled to Tura, the capital of Meghalaya, three times during the war as a representative of Tangail Mukti Bahini to bring arms and ammunitions. Brigadier Sanat Singh was my contact and host. He arranged my meetings with Gen Gill and Brigadier Klair during my first and second visit in June and July, respectively. During my third visit, I had the honour to meet Lt. Gen. Aurora, the GOC of the Eastern Command of the Indian Army, at the office of Gen Gill in Tura on November 7th.
In the meeting, Gen Aurora indicated that Indian paratroopers could be dropped in Tangail by the end of November or early December. He asked me to return to Tangail as soon as possible and make arrangements to secure an area so that Indian paratroopers could land safely. He also disclosed that several officers of the Indian Army would come to the liberated zones in Tangail and stay with us. We would be responsible for their security.
At the end of the meeting, General Aurora warned me that under no circumstance, should I share this information with anyone other than Kader Siddiqui. He further mentioned that I was the first Bangladeshi person privy to the details of this top secret military operation. He reminded me repeatedly of the importance of this message and asked me to comply accordingly.
As we shook hands to say goodbye, General Aurora mentioned, “This is the Liberation War of your motherland. I am certain you will be able to make good on your promise to your country. I hope to see you in Tangail.”
I evaluated my meeting with Gen Aurora as a signal for our impending victory.
Accordingly, an Indian officer crossed the border and arrived in Tangail. He was perhaps the first Indian Army officer to infiltrate more than one hundred miles into the Bangladesh free zone before the war started. I met him on 3 December in Baroiotol, a village on the Dhaleshwari River near Bhuapur. He introduced himself as Peter and we exchanged passwords. I came to know that he was a Captain in the Indian Army and that he was a Bengali from Kolkata. He had arrived in the free zone just a night earlier, escorted by five freedom fighters, three of whom were trained wireless set operators. His mission was to contact Kader (Tiger) Siddiqui and select the strategic locations for the landing of the Indian paratroopers. All relevant information was to be sent back to his controlling headquarter.
The next morning, Kader left to oversee the massive preparation for the impending attacks. On December 7, Peter and I left the boat and camped by the side of Nikrail School. Kader showed up in our camp. He formally put me in charge of communication regarding all subsequent attacks and placed one hundred fifty freedom fighters under my command. My job was to coordinate communication among the different companies, to maintain constant contact with Kader, and to help Peter in his work. Kader's presence and the news of India's recognition of Bangladesh created a feverish excitement amongst the people. After the evening prayers, thousands of people assembled at the school ground. Kader gave a passionate speech.
Captain Peter was deeply impressed by the large turnout, and the support and enthusiasm of the population. We left Nikrail to move towards Ghatail. We reached West of Ghatail by early morning on December 9 and set up a temporary camp at the house of Abdul Halim Chowdhury. With Madhupur captured, the road for the Indian Army to move from Jamalpur to Tangail was clear and Captain Peter relayed this information to his command.
On the morning of December 10, Brigadier Kader Khan's troops, after their defeat at Jamalpur and Mymensingh, were fleeing towards Dhaka.
That afternoon (December 11), Peter received a coded message from his headquarters and burst into joy. He told me that the paratroopers would be landing shortly. I, then, sent a message to Kader which simply said, “They are coming,” alerting the commanders of the area.
At five in the afternoon, two Indian Air Force MiGs flew very low over Ghatail and Kalihati.
We did not know which dropping area they would choose as the MiGs circled a very wide area. Then we saw the cargo planes, flying above the circling MiGs. Suddenly, the two MiGs shot up towards the stratosphere as the cargo planes slowly descended. They were Indian Air Force transport planes, AN-12, C-119, and CD-3. The planes descended in waves. As they approached their lowest point of descent, they came to a slow hover. It was as if they were floating in the air. Suddenly their bellies opened and parachutes began dropping.
The southeastern sky, as far as we could see, was covered with what looked like big balloons. On a sunny and breezy afternoon, the blue sky of Tangail was brilliantly recomposed with a spectacular view created by the paratroopers. For those who were lucky enough to watch, it was an unforgettable moment.
At eight in the evening, Kader stopped by our camp. He reassured Peter that the landing was successful and that the paratroopers had made contact with the Mukti Bahini. Kader told us that the highways connecting Madhupur, Gopalpur, Kalihati, and Sholakura were now all under the full control of the Mukti Bahini. The fleeing Pakistani soldiers had been attacked from various positions on the Tangail-Madhupur Highway. About twenty vehicles of the Pakistan Army had been destroyed and more than fifty soldiers had been killed. The Mukti Bahini had been able to capture a number of vehicles as well as a huge quantity of arms and explosives.
At five in the morning, Kader headed out with his troops to Tangail along the Mymensingh-Tangail Highway. Peter and I were also with him. We were welcomed at the liberated Kalihati headquarters by Commanders Nabi Newaz, Riaz, and Samad Gama. They reported that their forces were in full control of the Kalihati Police Station and that Tangail Highway was in our control as far south as Sholakura.
We then moved to Sholakura but were halted at the Sholakura Bridge by enemy fire. At this time, several volunteers arrived escorting a contingent of paratroopers. Behind the force of last night's gusty winds, these paratroopers drifted away from their targeted position and thus they could not join in the battle fought the previous night. Captain Peter was delighted to meet his colleagues, amongst whom was a young Captain.
Captain Peter then left us and joined up with the paratroopers and we resumed our advance to Phultala. Kader attacked Phultala with mortars and then sent about 300 fighters to take the village. By afternoon, the enemy fled and Phultala came under our control.
We learnt through radio contact that Brigadier Klair of the Indian Army was on his way to Tangail. I, with a team of freedom fighters, left for Pungli Bridge to meet the Indian paratroopers. As we walked on the road to Pungli Bridge, I came face to face with the bone-chilling scenes of last night's battle. Corpses of hundreds of enemy soldiers littered the road; the bodies sprawled from one side of the bridge to the other. We walked with care so as not to step on the dead. All around was a mass of twisted mangled bodies and body parts. Never in my life had I seen so much death in one place.
It was about three in the afternoon. When Brigadier Klair and Kader Siddiqui stepped down, five hundred freedom fighters and paratroopers received them with thundering applause.
Brigadier Klair came over to me and thanked me for the help and cooperation extended by the Mukti Bahini.
From the Indian officers I learnt that in the battle around Pungli Bridge, three hundred-seventy Pakistan soldiers were killed and more than one hundred injured. Six Indian paratroopers achieved martyrdom and 15 were injured. Over 600 Pakistani troops were taken prisoner.
After the meeting, Kader and Klair decided to move on to Tangail that same evening. Most of the town of Tangail was in the hands of the Mukti Bahini. However, a small contingent of Pakistani forces at the new Tangail town garrison had not yet surrendered though it was cut off from all sides. An attack was launched at four o'clock that evening with about 200 Freedom Fighters, supported by mortar and machine gun fire. Very soon, the enemy guns were silenced and the last remnants of resistance at Tangail ceased.
By that evening, the whole town stood liberated. By now, tens of thousands of people had begun assembling around the Awami League premises to see Kader and to celebrate our victory. Brigadier Klair then came over to join in the celebrations.
This for me was the last major action of the war. The Pakistan army was on the run and its eventual defeat was now simply a matter of time.
Reflecting on the War, I think Captain Peter's infiltration deep inside the enemy territory reveals a well thought out deception plan that has not been fully appreciated by analysts.
As Indian forces were not concentrated here, the Pakistani leadership presumed that no major attack was envisaged by the Indian Army through this sector and so an elderly Pakistani officer, Brigadier Kader Khan was left in charge. In my view, this was an intentional move by General Aurora to mislead the enemy into thinking that the Indian Army advance into Dhaka would take place through the Comilla border.
Meanwhile, on December 11th, General Jacob, the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, arranged a press conference in Calcutta. He declared to the national and international press that the night before, Indian paratroopers had landed surrounding Dhaka city. He claimed that Dhaka was then a besieged city, waiting to fall any day.
On the insistence of reporters, General Jacob reluctantly disclosed that a division of joint forces had surrounded Dhaka city.
However, in reality, the division he referred to was actually only single battalion of paratroopers who had landed, not in Dhaka, but rather some seventy miles to the north, in Tangail district.
Pakistani command was distressed by this bluff. It created a tremendous amount of psychological pressure on General Niazi to surrender. The joint force strategy worked just as planned.
This Para drop at Tangail caught the Pakistani leadership on the wrong foot and hastened the end of the war. For Brigadier Khan, this was the second surrender of his military carrier. During our interrogation, we came to know that he had also surrendered to the Indian Army on the West Pakistan border during the India-Pakistan War of 1965.
The inclusion of the Tangail Mukti Bahini in the original war strategy to conquer Dhaka was an important historical event. One of the most significant components to this plan was the landing of a battalion of paratroopers in Tangail.
Arguably, I was the first person in Bangladesh to have had the privilege of knowing this vital secret plan.
I was lucky and honoured to be associated with such a clever war strategy. It was also a great testament to Kader as well as to the Tangail Mukti Bahini.
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The writer is a Freedom Fighter and scientist.

INDEPENDENCE DAY SPECIAL 2015
Naval Commandos in Operation Jackpot
Submariner talks about the first military response from France
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Commodore Abdul Wahed Chowdhury, Photo: Sk Enamul Haq

Commodore Abdul Wahed Chowdhury, BU BB s/m (G) psc (rtd) of the Bangladesh Navy is one of the highest gallantry awardees living. Commodore Chowdhury was the Chief of Operation Jackpot, a Naval CNaval Commandos in Operation Jackpotommando Operation that attacked and sank ships at Chittagong port by the Karanafuli River on August 15, 1971. Beginning his career as a submariner in PNS Gazi in 1964, he later served in Bangladesh Navy holding many important positions including the Director of Naval Intelligence and a member of the National Committee. He won many national and international awards during the service. In an exclusive interview, Commodore Chowdhury talks to Amitava Kar of The Daily Star about the Liberation War and the success of Operation Jackpot.

The Daily Star (TDS): Please describe to us the circumstances under which the Naval Commando Force was formed.
Commodore AW Chowdhury (AWC): In March 1971, I was in France serving as a submariner in PNS Mangro, a Daphné-class submarine. We had a total crew of 45 -- 13 of them Bangalis and the rest, Pakistanis. The 7th March speech of Bangabandhu deeply moved us. The crackdown of 25th March changed everything. How could they run innocent people over with tanks? I made up my mind. I would join the Liberation War and persuade the other Bangalis on board to join me. We would leave the submarine without telling our Pakistani colleagues because from their point of view it would be nothing but mutiny. We were the first military personnel who responded to the call of liberation from abroad (France) on March 29, 1971.

TDS: How did you manage to communicate with them under tight scrutiny?
AWC: I did not talk to anyone about this on the submarine. It was only when we came to our shore accommodation that I informed them—one person at a time so that there would be no witness. I was in charge of the safe where all confidential documents and passports were kept. I took out all 45 passports and put them in the cupboard in my room on the shore. If I took out only the 13 passports belonging to the Bangali submariners, it would raise a red flag. Finally, out of the 13 Bangalis, only 8 joined us.


Video
Naval Commandos in Operation Jackpot
Submariner talks about the first military response from France. Commodore Abdul Wahed Chowdhury, BU BB s/m (G) psc (rtd) of the Bangladesh Navy is one of the highest gallantry awardees living.

TDS: How did you plan to join the war?
AWC: The plan was to cross the French border and go to Geneva. We wanted to reach India, go close to the border of Bangladesh and join the Liberation War as soon as possible. A friend, a South African submariner, told me that Switzerland was a neutral country and we could apply for political asylum in Geneva. France was likely to support Pakistan because the Pakistani government had purchased the submarine from France.

TDS: Did everything go according to plan?
AWC: I purchased train tickets for all of them. We left Toulon one by one or in a group of two, leaving the rest of the passports in my cupboard. But when we tried to enter Switzerland we were told that we needed a visa to enter. We did not want to seem suspicious. So I talked to the lady at the immigration in French and told her that we would go back to Paris and come back with our visas.

TDS: What did you do next?
AWC: We boarded a train to Paris and got down in Lyon. I found out that we could enter Spain without a visa. Next morning we were on a train to Barcelona. We contacted the Indian Consulate in Barcelona immediately. They sent us to Madrid and the approval for our political asylum in India came through in 10 minutes. We would go to Rome and from there we would catch a flight to India in an Indian Airliner which was coming from New York. But it got delayed in New York due to a labour strike. While disembarking in Rome, we saw a lot of journalists and cameramen waiting for us. Once we were on board, Mr. Sri Bedi, Charges de Affairs of the Indian High Commission, had told the press about our defection.

TDS: Did you get in trouble because of this?
AWC: The Pakistan embassy officials got the news and came rushing to snatch us away. But we said, “Look, we were born afresh on March 26. We are going to fight for our country.” So instead of waiting for 10 hours in Rome, in the duration of which a lot of things could have gone wrong (Italy had a good relationship with Pakistan), we went to Geneva. Within an hour, we were on a flight to Bombay. When we arrived at Bombay we were taken to Delhi and put in different safe locations. It was decided that the 8 of us were going to become Naval Commandos.

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TDS: Please tell us about Operation Jackpot.
AWC: There were two routes for the Pakistanis to reach Bangladesh. One was by air and it was blocked by India. The other was the sea which the Pakistanis were using to send logistical support to their soldiers in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh forces under General Osmani and the Indian authorities jointly decided to block this route to cut off their supply line. We did not have a navy or any ships. We, the 8 commandos, were going to do it. Under our leadership we trained about 500 brave young men. On 21st May the camp began at Palashi by the Bhagirathi River in Nadiya district. We rigorously trained for 18 hours a day for three months.

TDS: What impact did Operation Jackpot have on the Liberation War?
AWC: The commando operation was unique with a 100 percent success rate. It broke the lifeline of the Pakistanis in totality and they had no option but to surrender soon. We planned to destroy four places—Chittagong, Mongla, Chandpur and Narayanganj. Chittagong was the most important. I was the Chief of Operation Jackpot in Chittagong with 60 commandos under my command. The mission was to sink ships by using Limpet mines and block the channel. We attacked each ship with 3 commandos. It was practically a suicidal mission. Dr. Shah Alam BU was my deputy commander. They were all courageous commandos. The assistance of local associates was also great.
We attacked 11 ships on the 14th August night after midnight, demolishing 9 ships. Chittagong port was declared nonoperational for international shipping. We did it with zero casualties. Subsequently, Operation Jackpot sank 45 ships in Bangladesh -- in Chittagong, Mongla, Chandpur and Narayanganj. We bowled them out.

TDS: What's your message going forward?
AWC: Today, I want to say we have no enemy. How can we be an enemy to each other? Are we not all Bangladeshis? Let us build this country together, look after the little ones with love and affection. Bangladesh is the most beautiful country in the world and her people are the best. Liberation War comes once in a lifetime. I am proud that I could avail the opportunity and to some extent prove my leadership in the crisis of Bangladesh during the Liberation War. Will prove it again if need be.

 

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INDEPENDENCE DAY SPECIAL 2015
My reflections on this day
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Mohammad Kibria, Memories of 1971, Courtesy: Depart

Shamsuddin Ahmed
I was a Major serving on secondment from the Pakistan Army in the then East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) in the Chittagong Sector when the War of Liberation broke out. I was commander of an EPR Wing (now a Battalion in BGB). On that fateful day, March 26 1971, I was on a tour of inspection of the Border Outposts (BOPs) of my wing on the Ramgar-Khagrachari border along the Feni River. It was past midnight when I woke up amid shouts of Joy Bangla and Joy Bangabandhu by the troops of the BOP wher eI was staying over that night. The troops had clearly risen in revolt against Pakistan. They had tied up two non-Bangali troops of the BOP and were about to kill them had I not intervened, while the third one had managed to swim across the Feni River to safety in India. The BOP troops commanded by a Havildar took little time to rise in revolt after they heard on the EPR wireless network that Pakistan army troops had attacked Dhaka University dormitories, EPR headquarters at Peelkhana, Police Lines at Rajarbagh and the East Bengal Regimental Centre at Chittagong cantonment that night, and had fired upon and killed indiscriminately unarmed Bangalis. I was told that EPR troops had risen in revolt throughout the country. Clearly the uneducated EPR troops under my command had already been fired up with Bangali nationalism and patriotism, and had switched their loyalty to a sovereign Bangladesh yet to be born.

Indeed the measure of the political upsurge having swept across the country for freedom and emancipation from Pakistan had been so strong and widespread that it could not but ignite the patriotic fervour of this largely Bangali para military force. I have no hesitation to say that the EPR troops under my command spontaneously rose in revolt, while I, as their commander, just followed suit. I closely observed, during the nine month long war of liberation, the grim determination of my EPR troops entrenched in the border area, saw streams of our people of varying social status crossing the border into India and finally came in touch with our brave young boys cheerfully going inside the country with light weapons and explosives to fight the occupation army and face sure martyrdom. I was in no doubt that the freedom loving people of this country would not stop short of achieving freedom and democracy no matter what the cost would be like. Indeed our victory on December 16, 1971 has been rather pyrrhic. Three million people embraced martyrdom. Thousands of our womenfolk were dishonoured. Over ten million people fled to India and lived in refugee camps. But this sacrifice was not just for carving out Bangladesh on the map of the world. For the teeming millions, the goal was to establish democracy, freedom and fundamental rights of our people on a firm footing which we were denied in Pakistan.

A long 43 years have gone by since we had declared our independence from Pakistan on this day. But democracy and freedom shaping and guiding our destiny and most importantly the system of governance of this country have remained a far cry. Much as our politicians cutting across the political divide would cry hoarse in meetings and seminars for democracy and rule of law, and condemn military dictatorship or autocratic rule by a military junta, all our political governments without exception have preferred to rule this country like Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan ruled us in Pakistan, and later Hussian Muhammad Ershad, our local variant of the Pakistani dictators, ruled us in Bangladesh.

It is a pity that while there is a flourishing and vibrant democracy in neighbouring India, the largest democracy in the world, democracy and democratic culture have not been allowed to strike roots in our national politics and the mainstream political parties. Dynastic rule and anti-people politics are what our politicians have opted for. Sheikh Hasina has been the president of Awami League ever since she was elevated to this post in the eighties. No one would challenge her in the party congress. It is she who would appoint the party leaders at different tiers. No need for election. This is how the party congresses have been stage-managed all these years. The same is the case with Begum Khaleda Zia and her BNP.
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The writer is a Freedom Fighter and retired Brigadier General.

INDEPENDENCE DAY SPECIAL 2015
Killing of the best Bengali pilots of PIA
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Illustration: Ahmed Nazir, Memory Of 71, Courtesy: Depart

Lt. Col. (Retd.) Quazi Sajjad Ali Zahir Bir Protik
PIA - Pakistan International Airlines was the government owned airline of Pakistan. Pakistanis used to put a lot of hindrance to the Bengalis who wanted to join PIA. But the negative attitude of the Pakistanis used to discourage them from joining PIA. Only a small percentage of Bengalis had the opportunity of joining the airlines, especially as a pilot. The appointments which were unimportant in nature and where West Pakistanis did not like to serve used to be allocated to the Bengalis. The Bengali pilots were kept under strict surveillance so that they could not organise themselves. They were also not posted in any sensitive appointments.

The Bengali pilots tried for many years to raise their demand against the discrimination through PIA Pilots Association. But as they were few in numbers and did not hold effective positions in the association, their demands were not accepted. Having no other alternative, the Bengali pilots decided to form their own association but kept it clandestine at the beginning. In early February 1971, Shahkur Ullah Durrani, the Managing Director of PIA came for a visit to Dhaka. A few Bengali pilots from the association met Durrani in Hotel Intercontinental where he was staying and discussed with him about the problems they were facing. Durrani listened to their grievances and advised them to submit their points in writing which was done immediately. No action was taken on the points after submission. But Durrani was able to identify the persons who were raising their voices for their demands which he was known to have passed on to the military authorities. Durrani, in his youth, served in the Pakistan Army for three years as an officer and maintained regular liaison with the defence forces. As such, he passed on the detailed information on the activities of the Bengali pilots especially about the association members which had helped the army to apprehend and eliminate the Bengali pilots and officials of PIA at a later date.

The Bengali pilots formed an association namely East Pakistan Airlines Pilot Association (EPALPA). The first few meetings were secretly held in the house of Captain Alamgir at 9/6 Iqbal Road, Block A, Mohammadpur, Dacca. But this was noticed by the intelligence agency of Pakistan namely ISI. Intelligence officials were seen watching the house when the meetings were held.

Steps were taken for immediate registration of EPALPA for giving it a legal coverage. A committee of 10 members were formed which included Captain W.R. Chowdhury, Captain Abdul Khaleque, Captain A T M Alamgir, Captain Alamgir Sattar, Captain Zahir, Captain Rafi, Captain Abu Salem, Captain Monowar, Captain Khondkar, Captain Shahabuddin Ahmed, Captain Zaman. The committee enjoyed the overwhelming support of all the Bengali pilots. Captain W.R. Chowdhury was elected as Chairman and Captain Alamgir as the General Secretary of EPALPA. The newly formed committee started functioning from a room in Awlad Hussain Market at Old Airport Road. A news bulletin namely Bihango Barta started being published which used to be edited by Captain Alamgir.

Captain Khaleque who was the Vice Chairman of the committee was posted to Karachi. In the first week of February 1971, he came from Karachi to Dacca and informed the committee that a build up of massive troops had started to be implemented and soldiers were being flown into Dacca Airport in civil dress in large numbers from Karachi. Also, troops were being flown into Dacca from Lahore and Rawalpindi by special PIA flights via China and Burma. He also informed that in his flight every passenger (other than him) appeared to be from the army. He even had to come sitting in the jump seat. Most of the flights were landing in Dacca in the dead of the night. He requested this information to be passed on to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Captain Sattar, who was assigned the task, went to Bangabandhu and briefed him about the activities related to the movement of troops. The arrival of troops started to be monitored by the EPALPA members and in the first week of March, Captain Shahab and Captain Sattar went to Bangabandhu's house and informed him on the details of the latest movement of troops. From 1 March, restriction was in place for all Bengali pilots and staff of PIA from entering the airport without specific clearance from the airport management. The routine activities in the airport were being conducted by West Pakistani and East Pakistani non-Bengali officers and staff. Protesting this order, EPALPA decided that no Bengali pilots will fly any aircraft. Few West Pakistani pilots were brought in but they failed to meet the flight schedule. In the backdrop of the situation, Bangabandhu delivered the historic 7 March speech to the nation. The association started making plan to resist the Pakistan army as per directive of Bangabandhu. EPALPA officials prepared a plan consisting of 44 pages for forming a new airline which was submitted to Bangabandhu on 22 March 1971. The Association planned to take away a few small aircrafts and keep them in abandoned runways in hiding so that they may be used by the resistance forces in near future.

On 25 March afternoon, around 4.30 p.m., some of the pilots saw Yahya Khan leaving Dacca Airport secretly. They informed all concerned about it. On the night of March 25, the Pakistan Army started Operation Search Light and simultaneously started raiding the houses of all important Bengalis including Bengali pilots. They were able to arrest Captain Sikander and immediately killed him. Later, from various locations in the city they were able to arrest Captain Amirul Islam, Captain Alamgir, Captain N S Haider and Deputy Managing Director (DMD) of PIA Fazlul Haq Chowdhury. These four pilots were most qualified instructor pilots out of total five Bengali instructor pilots. Only one instructor pilot Captain Nazrul, who was in his village, could save his life. Other than the pilots and DMD, 23 other Bengali officers and staff of PIA were killed by Pakistan Army. Among the members of EPALPA, Captain Khaleque joined the Liberation War and was awarded Bir Protik, Captain Alamgir Sattar awarded Bir Protik and Captain Sahab Bir Uttam.

The Pakistanis had made a detailed plan to kill the best and most talented Bengalis who could provide leadership to a new independent nation. These officials were arrested and no information reached their families who faced incomprehensive sufferings waiting for their dear ones to return which never happened. Pakistan Army killed the Bengali DMD and four best instructor pilots so that they could not train any more Bengali pilots. The savages and blood thirsty elements of Pakistan Army took away the defenceless captives and eliminated them. Their mortal remains were never found although much effort has been made by this writer of this article for many years, including the effort by conducting digging in the most likely places but in vain. These great sons of the soil never could see the wind of freedom and their souls till today could not feel the wind of justice.
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The writer is a Freedom Fighter, recipient of Swadhinata Padak and researcher on the Liberation War.

ePaper - The Daily Star | Bangladesh Top news, Business, Sports, Entertainment, Politics, Technology, World, Lifestyle and Crime news.

 

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Print News

 

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Before the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Indian Navy’s (IN) sole aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was docked in Visakhapatnam at the eastern coast of India. After the 1971 hostilities started, Indian naval intelligence got wind of Pakistani plans to target the Vikrant through its flagship submarine PNS Ghazi which was a Tench-class diesel-electric submarine leased from the US Navy. During the initial days of the war the IN stealthily moved Vikrant to a secret harbor (Port X-Ray) in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. However, it wanted the Pakistani Navy (PN) to think the Vikrant was still in Visakhapatnam. To do this, every week large orders for groceries were made from the IN’s port in Visakhapatnam. These orders were large enough to sustain the 1,340 sailors of the INS Vikrant, and to any observer (including Pakistani spies) it meant the Vikrant was in Visakhapatnam. Another ship INS Rajput was used as a decoy for INS Vikrant, and several wireless transmissions were made to/from INS Rajput (a larger ship has more wireless messages). A deliberately unencrypted telegram was also sent wirelessly through INS Rajput in the name of a sailor from INS Vikrant asking about the health of his mother who had fallen seriously ill.

Pakistani Navy took the bait and sent PNS Ghazi off the harbor entrance in Visakhapatnam, where she was sunk by depth charges of IN ships , becoming the only submarine sunk in war after World War II. The hull of the submarine still lies in the sea bed off the Visakhapatnam coast. INS Vikrant continued on to southern East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and played a pivotal role in the destruction of PN ports and ships.

 

[Max Pain]

The more I read about those events the more i get disgusted and Sad, I remember my parents saying what happened back in 71 was totally unjust yet It was totally forbidden for them to state their opinion against what was happening in East Pakistan during that time.
This is what prejudice does, when people dont get what they deserve, they use other means to do so.
Though we cant undo what happened, I can wish that hopefully we let go of our Past for a better future, the future where Pakistanis and Bengalis interact like Good friends.

 

[monitor]

Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gorkhas Leads to Early Surrender at Dacca
Brigadier Rattan Kaul

Brigadier Rattan Kaul chronicles the operations carried out by the Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) during the war in 1971 and how it led to the surrender of Dacca.

With the turmoil in (then) East Pakistan, the arrest of Sheikh Mujib-u-Rehman and declaration of Martial Law, by the end of April 1971, it had became evident that Indian Army would be required to prepare for war against East Pakistan. Accordingly, Eastern Command was directed to start planning for the operations. By the end of May 1971, a plan formulated at Eastern Command level enumerated an offensive along three major thrust lines. These were:

1. II Corps (4 and 9 Divisions) as Western Thrust towards Jessore
2. North-eastern thrust by part of XXIII Corps (20 Mountain Division and couple of brigades from Army reserves) towards Dinajpur/Bogra
3. Eastern thrust by IV Corps (8 (less a brigade), 57 and 23 Mountain Divisions).

The plan at this stage talked of Dacca as the final objective, but neither direction nor force level/formation was defined. By July 1971, at Army Headquarters level, a broad framework of a plan was made, which enumerated blockade and isolation of East Pakistan, segmenting Pakistani defences to prevent withdrawal or reinforcements and finally bypass fixed defences and secure important communication centres. Dacca, in these deliberations, was not defined as an objective.

Map showing river basins of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan)

In August, then COAS General, later Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, accompanied by then DGMO Major General K K Singh, visited the Headquarters of Eastern Command to discuss the plan. The team, as well as Army Commander, Lieutenant General J S Aurora, were sceptical about capturing Dacca within the time frame of a short war and felt that the orthodox techniques and shortage of bridging equipment would make Dacca unattainable. Finally, Khulna {II Corps} and Chittagong {IV Corps} were made terminal objectives, without mention of Dacca. At a later stage, the Navy agreed to blockade Chittagong in support of IV Corps operations. As a result of further discussions, a modified plan emerged. In this plan, objectives were divergent; II Corps to contact Padma River, XXIII Corps was to slice Hilli-Gaibanda Neck. Northern thrust of 101 Comn Zone was to be given a brigade (59), tentatively allocated a battalion para drop and the formation was to advance towards Jamalpur/Mymensingh/Tangail and had only River Brahmputra (500 metres wide) to cross to reach centre of then East Pakistan. IV Corps was to contact Meghna River and contain Sylhet. Even at this stage, no clear directives were given for capture of Dacca. However, the plan talked about regrouping of the forces after II Corps reaching Goalunda Ghat on Padma River, XXIII Corps reaching the confluence of Ganga and Brahmaputra called Hilli-Gaibanda Neck, while IV Corps was not expected to go beyond Meghna River and much was not expected of 101 Comn Zone. On 16th August, Army Headquarters issued Operation Instruction based on which Eastern Command issued instructions for objectives for each thrust. Even at this stage, Dacca was not mentioned in any of them. In this plan, the two formations that could reach Dacca were 101 Comn Zone and IV Corps, once it crossed Meghna River. But this was not defined. By this time, Mukhti Bahini forces, grouped under various sectors, were operative. Their results were as expected, but in spite of their best efforts, lacked the ability to hold ground for longer period(s). By the end of September and beginning of October, even Indian Army sub units went inside the East Pakistan territory in support of Mukhti Bahini operations; like Sarkar Bazar, Charkhai- Sylhet, Banga etc. These forays were more of harassment tasks, rather than contributing to the objectives enumerated in the Eastern Command plan. By the end of November, own troops had launched so called 'Knife Thrusts', aiming at attacking Pakistani regular troop positions; to capture territory and cause attrition. Dhalai, Atgram, Zakiganj etc. were some of such actions, which were successfully undertaken prior to declaration of war on 3rd December 1971. By this time, most of the formations had captured areas, which nearly positioned them ahead of their launch pads and many of these places were either their initial objectives or closer to them.

From this point onwards, this paper will deal with the main topic as to how Dacca became the terminal objective, ground and heliborne operations leading to the surrender at Dacca; mainly discussing the operations of 101 Comn Zone and IV Corps, which finally knocked on the doors of Dacca Cantonment. 101 Comn Zone had its objectives as Jamalpur/Jaidevpur with possible para drop at Tangail, to pose a threat from Northern direction. No time line was given to them and initial thrusts of this force, duly supported by Mukhti Bahini, progressed satisfactorily. After 9th December, an additional brigade (167) was given to them. IV Corps, as per plans, had planned to capture Comilla by D + 7, secure Meghna River Line by D + 18, secure approaches to Sylhet and if possible capture Sylhet (No time frame was given for the capture of Sylhet. D Day being the day War breaks out/offensive is launched). Akhaura was to be captured for the security of Agartala and finally Chittagong was to be isolated/ captured after completion of all other tasks. As the operations progressed in the 8 Mountain Division sector, 81 Mountain Brigade captured Shamsher Nagar Airfield, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) captured Gazipur on the night of 4/5 December, after an attack the night before by 6 Rajput had failed. By 6th December morning, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had secured the Kalaura rail head leading to Sylhet.

On the evening of 6th December, IV Corps was directed by Eastern Command to launch Heliborne Operation at Sylhet on the next day (7th December). This heliborne operation was planned and launched on the presumption and information that troops from Sylhet had withdrawn, various axes leading to Sylhet secured and there would be no or nominal resistance to the heliborne force. Also, satellite reconnaissance from a friendly country had revealed that Sylhet was unoccupied. However, confirmed and corroborated information was that 22 Baluch had prematurely withdrawn from Kalaura, after an attack on Gazipur by 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), to Sylhet, which was indicative enough that Sylhet was occupied ab-initio by reasonable strength and further strengthened. Actually at Eastern Command a Pakistani message from Dacca to Pakistani 14 Infantry Division was intercepted, which gave orders to the division to move a brigade of the division to Meghna River. The assessment at Eastern Command level was that the only brigade which could be withdrawn from the Pakistani 14 Infantry Division had to be from Sylhet proper, giving an assessment that Sylhet was or would soon be vacated. At IV Corps Headquarters, Corps Commander Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, never mentioning about the directive of the Eastern Command, gave the impression that Sylhet Garrison wanted to surrender and hence a Heliborne Operation by a Battalion, which would be walk-in for the Battalion. The Corps Commander had discussions with Major General K. V. Krishna Rao, GOC 8 Mountain Division, and it was decided to launch 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) for the operation. As per General Rao, in spite of heavy casualties in two successful attacks at Atgram and Gazipur, "It was the best battalion in my Division. It has great pride and esprit de corps; a feeling that nothing will deter and are prepared to make any sacrifice." Based on these inputs, the first reconnaissance flight to Sylhet was carried out on the morning of 7th December at about 1000 hours, when Commander 59 Mountain Brigade Brigadier C. A. Quinn, Group Captain Chandan Singh Commander 6 TAC, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Harolikar, and Wing Commander R. S. Sandhu flew over Sylhet. No fire was drawn, reinforcing the idea that Sylhet was vacated.

With a plethora of intelligence information, confidence at higher level was that Sylhet was vacated. Two companies under a Commanding Officer took off from Kalaura and landed at Mirpara on the outskirts of Sylhet, at 3 PM on 7th December 1971. The landing was contested by Pakistani troops, heavy MMG fire and artillery shells, indicating that Sylhet was occupied and well defended. The landing troops held ground in spite of strong reaction and counter attacks. There were no further flights on 7th December and the balance of the Battalion build up happened only on the next morning (8th) and adopted wider deployment to give the impression of a larger force having landed. The media added further inputs by reporting that a brigade had been heli-landed at Sylhet.

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Heli landing Sylhet - 7th December 1971

(Click on image to enlarge)

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Surrender Ceremony - 16th Dec. 1971, 4 PM

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On 8th December, the forward company commander of the heliborne force (Major Kaul) switched on his radio set and picked up a clear conversation of 313 Infantry Brigade having been in Sylhet and planning a counter attack on the heli-landed force. Due to wider deployment adopted by the Battalion, the Pakistanis were under the impression that a full brigade had landed and they were trying to regain some of the area with this counter attack. To quote Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Harolikar (in the book, Bravest of the Brave): "From a wireless transmission intercepted by Major Kaul, it was clear that 313 Infantry Brigade had arrived in Sylhet on 7th December and along with 202 Infantry Brigade, were planning an attack (with five companies) on Alfa (Major Rana) and Delta (Major Kaul) Companies, which were posing a serious threat to the bridge, besides also being a road block."

​

Lt. Gen J. S. Aurora with Hav. Dil Bahadur Chettri, MVC, and Lt Col A. B. Harolikar, MVC, after the war.

(Click on image to enlarge)

The information of the radio intercept was duly passed on to the higher formations. In the Pakistani plans, Pakistani Brigade (313) was meant to defend crossings over Meghna River, Coronation Bridge and approach to Dacca. Instead this brigade withdrew to Sylhet, on orders of the GOC Pakistani 14 Infantry Division (Qazi Majid) and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had now to tackle two brigades (202 and 313). The higher thinking on receipt of this information from the Battalion can be best summed up in the words of Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, PVSM (in the book, Birth of a Nation): "On 7th December, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles of 59 Mountain Brigade had been lifted by helicopters to the South-East of Sylhet across the Surma River. The Pakistanis had evacuated the civilian population from Sylhet and fortified the town. The Pakistani 202 Infantry Brigade held the defences. Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade, ex-Maulvi Bazar, joined the Sylhet Garrison, bringing the strength up to six battalions, one regiment of 105 mm. guns and one battery of 120 mm. mortars. The move of Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade from Maulvi Bazar to Sylhet had not been anticipated by us at Command Headquarters and came as a surprise. We had expected this brigade to fall back to Coronation Bridge on the Meghna River, for the defence of the Meghna crossing and Dacca. Had they done so, IV Corps progress across the Meghna would have been difficult. When we got the radio intercepts confirming their move to Sylhet, we were relieved. It meant for all practical purposes, that two infantry brigades were out on a limb at Sylhet, where they could be contained and their effectiveness neutralised. After the war, whilst interrogating the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Pakistani division (14), Major General Abdul Quazi (Qazi Majid), I asked him why he had moved this brigade to Sylhet. He replied that he was determined that he would not let us capture Sylhet. Niazi’s fortress strategy and the divisional commanders implementation of this policy speeded up the disintegration of Pakistani defence capabilities and facilitated the capture of Dacca."

Late Lieutenant General A.A.K Niazi narrates this move as treason (in the book, Betrayal of Pakistan): "Within the overall defensive plan of the sector, 14 Division had been entrusted with the task of defending Narsingdi-Narayanganj Sector. They were to fall back, when ordered, from Sylhet and Ashuganj. Sylhet Brigade had come down to Maulvi Bazar. Majid (GOC 14 Infantry Division) had been given the mission to fall back on Dacca after the destruction of the Bhairab Bazar Bridge. I ordered him to fall back to Narsingdi. He regretted his inability to do so. He was specially given six ferries for the move to Dacca and the railway line was also available to him - it was later used by Indians, and his troops watched the spectacle. He could easily have reached Dacca, but he never even made (an) attempt. It appears his disobedience was part of the plan to let the East Pakistan garrison face ignominy. He knew that the defence of Dacca was vital. Still he failed to obey. I, therefore, removed him from the command of his division and put his troops under the command of 36 Division." (After the war and repatriation, Major General Qazi Majid was tried by a Court Martial for treason).

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Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh and Maj. Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao with Hav. Dil Bahadur Chettri at Sylhet

(Click on image to enlarge)

On the morning of 9th December, on receipt of information at Command Headquarters and IV Corps, it was decided, that 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) having tied down two Pakistani Brigades at Sylhet (202 and 313), all resources must be geared to establish link up with the heliborne force. It was also appreciated that the Pakistanis had no force available to defend the Meghna crossings. What was the worry was that how far 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) could continue to hold the two brigades at Sylhet and advance to Meghna river. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh had his vision now fixed on Dacca, since the Meghna river would not be defended strongly and gave an opening towards Dacca. As per the earlier plans, contact of Meghna river by IV Corps was to be made by 21 December (D + 18 - D Day being 3rd December). At this stage, the plan of the IV Corps advance only upto the Meghna River was suddenly changed to be the first to cross the Meghna and race towards Dacca. Even at this stage, the surrender of Dacca was not envisaged. To implement this revised plan to cross the Meghna river, all helicopter resources meant for 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) were diverted on the 9th for ferrying operations of 311 Infantry Brigade and 57 Mountain Division and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) left on its own, with no link up for next 8 days. In fact, Heliborne Operations of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), now fondly called Sylhet Gurkhas, had tied down the brigades who would have defended Meghna/Dacca and this opened the route for an unopposed crossing of the Meghna river by IV Corps troops to enable them to pose a threat to Dacca from the Eastern Thrust Line.

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Sylhet Trophy Unveiled in 1983

(Click on image to enlarge)

The movement of IV Corps towards Dacca gained momentum and where the plans were to contact Meghna river on D + 18 (21st December), IV Corps troops reached and crossed Meghna river much earlier (14th December). On the 14th, 101 Comn Zone was placed under command of Advance Tactical Headquarters of IV Corps, in situ, at the behest of IV Corps, who were now around Meghna river. In the meantime, GOC 101 Comn Zone (Major General G. Nagra) along with his GSO 1 (Lt. Gen. Y. M. Bammi, PVSM, AVSM), and some forces (Company 2 Para, 6 Sikh LI and Mukhtis under Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC), reached Dacca on the morning of 16th at about 10 AM and established contact with General Niazi. In fact, Major General Nagra sent a small note on the scribbling pad of his GSO 1 to Niazi for an early meeting. They knew each other when Major General Nagra was Defence Attaché in Pakistan and Niazi was a brigade commander. At about 11 AM, Lieutenant General J. F. R. Jacob arrived and met Niazi and the surrender ceremony planned for the same evening. When this was happening at Dacca, Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) had been inside Sylhet town for nearly 24 hours, having had the surrender ceremony completed on 15th December at 3 PM, when IV Corps troops were nowhere close to Dacca. Then, on the morning of the 16th at 9 AM, they (Sylhet Gurkhas) took the physical charge of 3 Brigadiers, 1 Colonel, 107 officers, 219 JCOs and 6190 soldiers and 39 non-combatant Pakistanis.

An analysis of the Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gurkhas will indicate that the operation was mounted in an intelligence vacuum, in an area appreciated to be devoid of Pakistani troops. The Sylhet Gurkhas landing was opposed and not withstanding strong opposition, held ground till the two Pakistani brigades surrendered on 15th December, even before the official ceasefire. Had 313 Pakistan Infantry Brigade not moved into Sylhet, things would have been different at the theatre level. This could have been all the more different if Sylhet Gurkhas had not tied down the two brigades from the 7th to the 15th of December. Possibly, if Lieutenant General Niazi had succeeded in getting this brigade (313) to defend the Meghna river and Narsingdi, making movement of IV Corps as well as 101 Comn Zone towards Dacca difficult, the Dacca surrender may not have taken place on 16th December.

On a conservative estimate, the Heliborne Operation of Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) made it possible for Indian Army and Mukhti Bahini to reach Dacca much earlier than planned; at least by 8 days. On the 16th, when the surrender ceremony was going on at Dacca, Sylhet Gurkhas were celebrating with a toast, in honour of three fold success of the Battalion:

1. First Ever Successful Heliborne Operation of Indian Army, which tied the two brigades from the 7th to the 15th of December.
2. Surrender of two Pakistani Brigades (202 and 313) on 15th December 1971.
3. First major surrender to own forces in the Eastern Theatre.

But the fourth larger toast, unknown to them at that time, was reserved for surrender at Dacca, which was thought unattainable. For 'Early Dacca Surrender' was made possible by Sylhet Gurkhas tying down the Pakistani Meghna River Brigade (313), in addition to 202 Pak Infantry Brigade at Sylhet from the 7th to the 15th.

The Battalion by now had three successful major operations to its credit: Atgram, Ghazipur and Sylhet. However, the degree of valour and contribution to the early creation of free Bangladesh, credit also goes to the men of the Sylhet Gurkhas, but not without a price. The cost of glory over the 27 days (20th November to 16th December) was not meagre. Thirty one (4 Officers, 3 Junior Commissioned Officers, 7 Non-Commissioned Officers and 17 Riflemen) sacrificed their lives. Ironically one officer (Major Puri) and one Rifleman (Rifleman Kanta Bir Thapa) were injured during the 1965 War also, but this time they sacrificed their lives. Another 122 (7 Officers, 2 Junior Commissioned Officers, 32 Non- Commissioned Officers and 81 Riflemen) were injured. A total of 153 casualties, including 11 Officers, constituted nearly 25 percent of the Battalion strength, out of which 55 were leaders at different levels (Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers); nearly 8 percent of the Battalion strength. This was the leadership and lead provided by Company, Platoon and Section Commanders. Sylhet is the Battle Honour of The Sylhet Gurkhas and East Pakistan as Theatre Honour and nobody can deny that Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gurkhas lead to early surrender at Dacca in December 1971.



Brigadier Kaul was Assault Company Commander (D Company) during the infiltration Khukri attack at Atgram and Forward Company Commander during the Battle of Sylhet. He was seriously injured during the battle of Sylhet.

 

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Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gorkhas Leads to Early Surrender at Dacca
Brigadier Rattan Kaul

Brigadier Rattan Kaul chronicles the operations carried out by the Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) during the war in 1971 and how it led to the surrender of Dacca.

With the turmoil in (then) East Pakistan, the arrest of Sheikh Mujib-u-Rehman and declaration of Martial Law, by the end of April 1971, it had became evident that Indian Army would be required to prepare for war against East Pakistan. Accordingly, Eastern Command was directed to start planning for the operations. By the end of May 1971, a plan formulated at Eastern Command level enumerated an offensive along three major thrust lines. These were:

1. II Corps (4 and 9 Divisions) as Western Thrust towards Jessore
2. North-eastern thrust by part of XXIII Corps (20 Mountain Division and couple of brigades from Army reserves) towards Dinajpur/Bogra
3. Eastern thrust by IV Corps (8 (less a brigade), 57 and 23 Mountain Divisions).

The plan at this stage talked of Dacca as the final objective, but neither direction nor force level/formation was defined. By July 1971, at Army Headquarters level, a broad framework of a plan was made, which enumerated blockade and isolation of East Pakistan, segmenting Pakistani defences to prevent withdrawal or reinforcements and finally bypass fixed defences and secure important communication centres. Dacca, in these deliberations, was not defined as an objective.

Map showing river basins of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan)

In August, then COAS General, later Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, accompanied by then DGMO Major General K K Singh, visited the Headquarters of Eastern Command to discuss the plan. The team, as well as Army Commander, Lieutenant General J S Aurora, were sceptical about capturing Dacca within the time frame of a short war and felt that the orthodox techniques and shortage of bridging equipment would make Dacca unattainable. Finally, Khulna {II Corps} and Chittagong {IV Corps} were made terminal objectives, without mention of Dacca. At a later stage, the Navy agreed to blockade Chittagong in support of IV Corps operations. As a result of further discussions, a modified plan emerged. In this plan, objectives were divergent; II Corps to contact Padma River, XXIII Corps was to slice Hilli-Gaibanda Neck. Northern thrust of 101 Comn Zone was to be given a brigade (59), tentatively allocated a battalion para drop and the formation was to advance towards Jamalpur/Mymensingh/Tangail and had only River Brahmputra (500 metres wide) to cross to reach centre of then East Pakistan. IV Corps was to contact Meghna River and contain Sylhet. Even at this stage, no clear directives were given for capture of Dacca. However, the plan talked about regrouping of the forces after II Corps reaching Goalunda Ghat on Padma River, XXIII Corps reaching the confluence of Ganga and Brahmaputra called Hilli-Gaibanda Neck, while IV Corps was not expected to go beyond Meghna River and much was not expected of 101 Comn Zone. On 16th August, Army Headquarters issued Operation Instruction based on which Eastern Command issued instructions for objectives for each thrust. Even at this stage, Dacca was not mentioned in any of them. In this plan, the two formations that could reach Dacca were 101 Comn Zone and IV Corps, once it crossed Meghna River. But this was not defined. By this time, Mukhti Bahini forces, grouped under various sectors, were operative. Their results were as expected, but in spite of their best efforts, lacked the ability to hold ground for longer period(s). By the end of September and beginning of October, even Indian Army sub units went inside the East Pakistan territory in support of Mukhti Bahini operations; like Sarkar Bazar, Charkhai- Sylhet, Banga etc. These forays were more of harassment tasks, rather than contributing to the objectives enumerated in the Eastern Command plan. By the end of November, own troops had launched so called 'Knife Thrusts', aiming at attacking Pakistani regular troop positions; to capture territory and cause attrition. Dhalai, Atgram, Zakiganj etc. were some of such actions, which were successfully undertaken prior to declaration of war on 3rd December 1971. By this time, most of the formations had captured areas, which nearly positioned them ahead of their launch pads and many of these places were either their initial objectives or closer to them.

From this point onwards, this paper will deal with the main topic as to how Dacca became the terminal objective, ground and heliborne operations leading to the surrender at Dacca; mainly discussing the operations of 101 Comn Zone and IV Corps, which finally knocked on the doors of Dacca Cantonment. 101 Comn Zone had its objectives as Jamalpur/Jaidevpur with possible para drop at Tangail, to pose a threat from Northern direction. No time line was given to them and initial thrusts of this force, duly supported by Mukhti Bahini, progressed satisfactorily. After 9th December, an additional brigade (167) was given to them. IV Corps, as per plans, had planned to capture Comilla by D + 7, secure Meghna River Line by D + 18, secure approaches to Sylhet and if possible capture Sylhet (No time frame was given for the capture of Sylhet. D Day being the day War breaks out/offensive is launched). Akhaura was to be captured for the security of Agartala and finally Chittagong was to be isolated/ captured after completion of all other tasks. As the operations progressed in the 8 Mountain Division sector, 81 Mountain Brigade captured Shamsher Nagar Airfield, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) captured Gazipur on the night of 4/5 December, after an attack the night before by 6 Rajput had failed. By 6th December morning, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had secured the Kalaura rail head leading to Sylhet.

On the evening of 6th December, IV Corps was directed by Eastern Command to launch Heliborne Operation at Sylhet on the next day (7th December). This heliborne operation was planned and launched on the presumption and information that troops from Sylhet had withdrawn, various axes leading to Sylhet secured and there would be no or nominal resistance to the heliborne force. Also, satellite reconnaissance from a friendly country had revealed that Sylhet was unoccupied. However, confirmed and corroborated information was that 22 Baluch had prematurely withdrawn from Kalaura, after an attack on Gazipur by 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), to Sylhet, which was indicative enough that Sylhet was occupied ab-initio by reasonable strength and further strengthened. Actually at Eastern Command a Pakistani message from Dacca to Pakistani 14 Infantry Division was intercepted, which gave orders to the division to move a brigade of the division to Meghna River. The assessment at Eastern Command level was that the only brigade which could be withdrawn from the Pakistani 14 Infantry Division had to be from Sylhet proper, giving an assessment that Sylhet was or would soon be vacated. At IV Corps Headquarters, Corps Commander Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, never mentioning about the directive of the Eastern Command, gave the impression that Sylhet Garrison wanted to surrender and hence a Heliborne Operation by a Battalion, which would be walk-in for the Battalion. The Corps Commander had discussions with Major General K. V. Krishna Rao, GOC 8 Mountain Division, and it was decided to launch 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) for the operation. As per General Rao, in spite of heavy casualties in two successful attacks at Atgram and Gazipur, "It was the best battalion in my Division. It has great pride and esprit de corps; a feeling that nothing will deter and are prepared to make any sacrifice." Based on these inputs, the first reconnaissance flight to Sylhet was carried out on the morning of 7th December at about 1000 hours, when Commander 59 Mountain Brigade Brigadier C. A. Quinn, Group Captain Chandan Singh Commander 6 TAC, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Harolikar, and Wing Commander R. S. Sandhu flew over Sylhet. No fire was drawn, reinforcing the idea that Sylhet was vacated.

With a plethora of intelligence information, confidence at higher level was that Sylhet was vacated. Two companies under a Commanding Officer took off from Kalaura and landed at Mirpara on the outskirts of Sylhet, at 3 PM on 7th December 1971. The landing was contested by Pakistani troops, heavy MMG fire and artillery shells, indicating that Sylhet was occupied and well defended. The landing troops held ground in spite of strong reaction and counter attacks. There were no further flights on 7th December and the balance of the Battalion build up happened only on the next morning (8th) and adopted wider deployment to give the impression of a larger force having landed. The media added further inputs by reporting that a brigade had been heli-landed at Sylhet.

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Heli landing Sylhet - 7th December 1971

(Click on image to enlarge)

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Surrender Ceremony - 16th Dec. 1971, 4 PM

(Click on image to enlarge)

























On 8th December, the forward company commander of the heliborne force (Major Kaul) switched on his radio set and picked up a clear conversation of 313 Infantry Brigade having been in Sylhet and planning a counter attack on the heli-landed force. Due to wider deployment adopted by the Battalion, the Pakistanis were under the impression that a full brigade had landed and they were trying to regain some of the area with this counter attack. To quote Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Harolikar (in the book, Bravest of the Brave): "From a wireless transmission intercepted by Major Kaul, it was clear that 313 Infantry Brigade had arrived in Sylhet on 7th December and along with 202 Infantry Brigade, were planning an attack (with five companies) on Alfa (Major Rana) and Delta (Major Kaul) Companies, which were posing a serious threat to the bridge, besides also being a road block."

​

Lt. Gen J. S. Aurora with Hav. Dil Bahadur Chettri, MVC, and Lt Col A. B. Harolikar, MVC, after the war.

(Click on image to enlarge)

The information of the radio intercept was duly passed on to the higher formations. In the Pakistani plans, Pakistani Brigade (313) was meant to defend crossings over Meghna River, Coronation Bridge and approach to Dacca. Instead this brigade withdrew to Sylhet, on orders of the GOC Pakistani 14 Infantry Division (Qazi Majid) and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had now to tackle two brigades (202 and 313). The higher thinking on receipt of this information from the Battalion can be best summed up in the words of Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, PVSM (in the book, Birth of a Nation): "On 7th December, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles of 59 Mountain Brigade had been lifted by helicopters to the South-East of Sylhet across the Surma River. The Pakistanis had evacuated the civilian population from Sylhet and fortified the town. The Pakistani 202 Infantry Brigade held the defences. Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade, ex-Maulvi Bazar, joined the Sylhet Garrison, bringing the strength up to six battalions, one regiment of 105 mm. guns and one battery of 120 mm. mortars. The move of Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade from Maulvi Bazar to Sylhet had not been anticipated by us at Command Headquarters and came as a surprise. We had expected this brigade to fall back to Coronation Bridge on the Meghna River, for the defence of the Meghna crossing and Dacca. Had they done so, IV Corps progress across the Meghna would have been difficult. When we got the radio intercepts confirming their move to Sylhet, we were relieved. It meant for all practical purposes, that two infantry brigades were out on a limb at Sylhet, where they could be contained and their effectiveness neutralised. After the war, whilst interrogating the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Pakistani division (14), Major General Abdul Quazi (Qazi Majid), I asked him why he had moved this brigade to Sylhet. He replied that he was determined that he would not let us capture Sylhet. Niazi’s fortress strategy and the divisional commanders implementation of this policy speeded up the disintegration of Pakistani defence capabilities and facilitated the capture of Dacca."

Late Lieutenant General A.A.K Niazi narrates this move as treason (in the book, Betrayal of Pakistan): "Within the overall defensive plan of the sector, 14 Division had been entrusted with the task of defending Narsingdi-Narayanganj Sector. They were to fall back, when ordered, from Sylhet and Ashuganj. Sylhet Brigade had come down to Maulvi Bazar. Majid (GOC 14 Infantry Division) had been given the mission to fall back on Dacca after the destruction of the Bhairab Bazar Bridge. I ordered him to fall back to Narsingdi. He regretted his inability to do so. He was specially given six ferries for the move to Dacca and the railway line was also available to him - it was later used by Indians, and his troops watched the spectacle. He could easily have reached Dacca, but he never even made (an) attempt. It appears his disobedience was part of the plan to let the East Pakistan garrison face ignominy. He knew that the defence of Dacca was vital. Still he failed to obey. I, therefore, removed him from the command of his division and put his troops under the command of 36 Division." (After the war and repatriation, Major General Qazi Majid was tried by a Court Martial for treason).

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Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh and Maj. Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao with Hav. Dil Bahadur Chettri at Sylhet

(Click on image to enlarge)

On the morning of 9th December, on receipt of information at Command Headquarters and IV Corps, it was decided, that 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) having tied down two Pakistani Brigades at Sylhet (202 and 313), all resources must be geared to establish link up with the heliborne force. It was also appreciated that the Pakistanis had no force available to defend the Meghna crossings. What was the worry was that how far 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) could continue to hold the two brigades at Sylhet and advance to Meghna river. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh had his vision now fixed on Dacca, since the Meghna river would not be defended strongly and gave an opening towards Dacca. As per the earlier plans, contact of Meghna river by IV Corps was to be made by 21 December (D + 18 - D Day being 3rd December). At this stage, the plan of the IV Corps advance only upto the Meghna River was suddenly changed to be the first to cross the Meghna and race towards Dacca. Even at this stage, the surrender of Dacca was not envisaged. To implement this revised plan to cross the Meghna river, all helicopter resources meant for 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) were diverted on the 9th for ferrying operations of 311 Infantry Brigade and 57 Mountain Division and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) left on its own, with no link up for next 8 days. In fact, Heliborne Operations of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), now fondly called Sylhet Gurkhas, had tied down the brigades who would have defended Meghna/Dacca and this opened the route for an unopposed crossing of the Meghna river by IV Corps troops to enable them to pose a threat to Dacca from the Eastern Thrust Line.

​

Sylhet Trophy Unveiled in 1983

(Click on image to enlarge)

The movement of IV Corps towards Dacca gained momentum and where the plans were to contact Meghna river on D + 18 (21st December), IV Corps troops reached and crossed Meghna river much earlier (14th December). On the 14th, 101 Comn Zone was placed under command of Advance Tactical Headquarters of IV Corps, in situ, at the behest of IV Corps, who were now around Meghna river. In the meantime, GOC 101 Comn Zone (Major General G. Nagra) along with his GSO 1 (Lt. Gen. Y. M. Bammi, PVSM, AVSM), and some forces (Company 2 Para, 6 Sikh LI and Mukhtis under Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC), reached Dacca on the morning of 16th at about 10 AM and established contact with General Niazi. In fact, Major General Nagra sent a small note on the scribbling pad of his GSO 1 to Niazi for an early meeting. They knew each other when Major General Nagra was Defence Attaché in Pakistan and Niazi was a brigade commander. At about 11 AM, Lieutenant General J. F. R. Jacob arrived and met Niazi and the surrender ceremony planned for the same evening. When this was happening at Dacca, Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) had been inside Sylhet town for nearly 24 hours, having had the surrender ceremony completed on 15th December at 3 PM, when IV Corps troops were nowhere close to Dacca. Then, on the morning of the 16th at 9 AM, they (Sylhet Gurkhas) took the physical charge of 3 Brigadiers, 1 Colonel, 107 officers, 219 JCOs and 6190 soldiers and 39 non-combatant Pakistanis.

An analysis of the Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gurkhas will indicate that the operation was mounted in an intelligence vacuum, in an area appreciated to be devoid of Pakistani troops. The Sylhet Gurkhas landing was opposed and not withstanding strong opposition, held ground till the two Pakistani brigades surrendered on 15th December, even before the official ceasefire. Had 313 Pakistan Infantry Brigade not moved into Sylhet, things would have been different at the theatre level. This could have been all the more different if Sylhet Gurkhas had not tied down the two brigades from the 7th to the 15th of December. Possibly, if Lieutenant General Niazi had succeeded in getting this brigade (313) to defend the Meghna river and Narsingdi, making movement of IV Corps as well as 101 Comn Zone towards Dacca difficult, the Dacca surrender may not have taken place on 16th December.

On a conservative estimate, the Heliborne Operation of Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) made it possible for Indian Army and Mukhti Bahini to reach Dacca much earlier than planned; at least by 8 days. On the 16th, when the surrender ceremony was going on at Dacca, Sylhet Gurkhas were celebrating with a toast, in honour of three fold success of the Battalion:

1. First Ever Successful Heliborne Operation of Indian Army, which tied the two brigades from the 7th to the 15th of December.
2. Surrender of two Pakistani Brigades (202 and 313) on 15th December 1971.
3. First major surrender to own forces in the Eastern Theatre.

But the fourth larger toast, unknown to them at that time, was reserved for surrender at Dacca, which was thought unattainable. For 'Early Dacca Surrender' was made possible by Sylhet Gurkhas tying down the Pakistani Meghna River Brigade (313), in addition to 202 Pak Infantry Brigade at Sylhet from the 7th to the 15th.

The Battalion by now had three successful major operations to its credit: Atgram, Ghazipur and Sylhet. However, the degree of valour and contribution to the early creation of free Bangladesh, credit also goes to the men of the Sylhet Gurkhas, but not without a price. The cost of glory over the 27 days (20th November to 16th December) was not meagre. Thirty one (4 Officers, 3 Junior Commissioned Officers, 7 Non-Commissioned Officers and 17 Riflemen) sacrificed their lives. Ironically one officer (Major Puri) and one Rifleman (Rifleman Kanta Bir Thapa) were injured during the 1965 War also, but this time they sacrificed their lives. Another 122 (7 Officers, 2 Junior Commissioned Officers, 32 Non- Commissioned Officers and 81 Riflemen) were injured. A total of 153 casualties, including 11 Officers, constituted nearly 25 percent of the Battalion strength, out of which 55 were leaders at different levels (Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers); nearly 8 percent of the Battalion strength. This was the leadership and lead provided by Company, Platoon and Section Commanders. Sylhet is the Battle Honour of The Sylhet Gurkhas and East Pakistan as Theatre Honour and nobody can deny that Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gurkhas lead to early surrender at Dacca in December 1971.



Brigadier Kaul was Assault Company Commander (D Company) during the infiltration Khukri attack at Atgram and Forward Company Commander during the Battle of Sylhet. He was seriously injured during the battle of Sylhet.

Interestingly Indian photographs/paintings of the surrender ceremony cuts out the image of our rep, Gp Capt Khandokar.

 

[bongbang]

Interestingly Indian photographs/paintings of the surrender ceremony cuts out the image of our rep, Gp Capt Khandokar.

 

[monitor]

The link doesn't open. Rapes / killings were committed by PA and the locally raised irregulars.




Interestingly Indian photographs/paintings of the surrender ceremony cuts out the image of our rep, Gp Capt Khandokar.

they wanted to show its a purely India Pakistan war.

 

[Rajput_Pakistani]

Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gorkhas Leads to Early Surrender at Dacca
Brigadier Rattan Kaul

Brigadier Rattan Kaul chronicles the operations carried out by the Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) during the war in 1971 and how it led to the surrender of Dacca.

With the turmoil in (then) East Pakistan, the arrest of Sheikh Mujib-u-Rehman and declaration of Martial Law, by the end of April 1971, it had became evident that Indian Army would be required to prepare for war against East Pakistan. Accordingly, Eastern Command was directed to start planning for the operations. By the end of May 1971, a plan formulated at Eastern Command level enumerated an offensive along three major thrust lines. These were:

1. II Corps (4 and 9 Divisions) as Western Thrust towards Jessore
2. North-eastern thrust by part of XXIII Corps (20 Mountain Division and couple of brigades from Army reserves) towards Dinajpur/Bogra
3. Eastern thrust by IV Corps (8 (less a brigade), 57 and 23 Mountain Divisions).

The plan at this stage talked of Dacca as the final objective, but neither direction nor force level/formation was defined. By July 1971, at Army Headquarters level, a broad framework of a plan was made, which enumerated blockade and isolation of East Pakistan, segmenting Pakistani defences to prevent withdrawal or reinforcements and finally bypass fixed defences and secure important communication centres. Dacca, in these deliberations, was not defined as an objective.

Map showing river basins of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan)

In August, then COAS General, later Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, accompanied by then DGMO Major General K K Singh, visited the Headquarters of Eastern Command to discuss the plan. The team, as well as Army Commander, Lieutenant General J S Aurora, were sceptical about capturing Dacca within the time frame of a short war and felt that the orthodox techniques and shortage of bridging equipment would make Dacca unattainable. Finally, Khulna {II Corps} and Chittagong {IV Corps} were made terminal objectives, without mention of Dacca. At a later stage, the Navy agreed to blockade Chittagong in support of IV Corps operations. As a result of further discussions, a modified plan emerged. In this plan, objectives were divergent; II Corps to contact Padma River, XXIII Corps was to slice Hilli-Gaibanda Neck. Northern thrust of 101 Comn Zone was to be given a brigade (59), tentatively allocated a battalion para drop and the formation was to advance towards Jamalpur/Mymensingh/Tangail and had only River Brahmputra (500 metres wide) to cross to reach centre of then East Pakistan. IV Corps was to contact Meghna River and contain Sylhet. Even at this stage, no clear directives were given for capture of Dacca. However, the plan talked about regrouping of the forces after II Corps reaching Goalunda Ghat on Padma River, XXIII Corps reaching the confluence of Ganga and Brahmaputra called Hilli-Gaibanda Neck, while IV Corps was not expected to go beyond Meghna River and much was not expected of 101 Comn Zone. On 16th August, Army Headquarters issued Operation Instruction based on which Eastern Command issued instructions for objectives for each thrust. Even at this stage, Dacca was not mentioned in any of them. In this plan, the two formations that could reach Dacca were 101 Comn Zone and IV Corps, once it crossed Meghna River. But this was not defined. By this time, Mukhti Bahini forces, grouped under various sectors, were operative. Their results were as expected, but in spite of their best efforts, lacked the ability to hold ground for longer period(s). By the end of September and beginning of October, even Indian Army sub units went inside the East Pakistan territory in support of Mukhti Bahini operations; like Sarkar Bazar, Charkhai- Sylhet, Banga etc. These forays were more of harassment tasks, rather than contributing to the objectives enumerated in the Eastern Command plan. By the end of November, own troops had launched so called 'Knife Thrusts', aiming at attacking Pakistani regular troop positions; to capture territory and cause attrition. Dhalai, Atgram, Zakiganj etc. were some of such actions, which were successfully undertaken prior to declaration of war on 3rd December 1971. By this time, most of the formations had captured areas, which nearly positioned them ahead of their launch pads and many of these places were either their initial objectives or closer to them.

From this point onwards, this paper will deal with the main topic as to how Dacca became the terminal objective, ground and heliborne operations leading to the surrender at Dacca; mainly discussing the operations of 101 Comn Zone and IV Corps, which finally knocked on the doors of Dacca Cantonment. 101 Comn Zone had its objectives as Jamalpur/Jaidevpur with possible para drop at Tangail, to pose a threat from Northern direction. No time line was given to them and initial thrusts of this force, duly supported by Mukhti Bahini, progressed satisfactorily. After 9th December, an additional brigade (167) was given to them. IV Corps, as per plans, had planned to capture Comilla by D + 7, secure Meghna River Line by D + 18, secure approaches to Sylhet and if possible capture Sylhet (No time frame was given for the capture of Sylhet. D Day being the day War breaks out/offensive is launched). Akhaura was to be captured for the security of Agartala and finally Chittagong was to be isolated/ captured after completion of all other tasks. As the operations progressed in the 8 Mountain Division sector, 81 Mountain Brigade captured Shamsher Nagar Airfield, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) captured Gazipur on the night of 4/5 December, after an attack the night before by 6 Rajput had failed. By 6th December morning, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had secured the Kalaura rail head leading to Sylhet.

On the evening of 6th December, IV Corps was directed by Eastern Command to launch Heliborne Operation at Sylhet on the next day (7th December). This heliborne operation was planned and launched on the presumption and information that troops from Sylhet had withdrawn, various axes leading to Sylhet secured and there would be no or nominal resistance to the heliborne force. Also, satellite reconnaissance from a friendly country had revealed that Sylhet was unoccupied. However, confirmed and corroborated information was that 22 Baluch had prematurely withdrawn from Kalaura, after an attack on Gazipur by 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), to Sylhet, which was indicative enough that Sylhet was occupied ab-initio by reasonable strength and further strengthened. Actually at Eastern Command a Pakistani message from Dacca to Pakistani 14 Infantry Division was intercepted, which gave orders to the division to move a brigade of the division to Meghna River. The assessment at Eastern Command level was that the only brigade which could be withdrawn from the Pakistani 14 Infantry Division had to be from Sylhet proper, giving an assessment that Sylhet was or would soon be vacated. At IV Corps Headquarters, Corps Commander Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, never mentioning about the directive of the Eastern Command, gave the impression that Sylhet Garrison wanted to surrender and hence a Heliborne Operation by a Battalion, which would be walk-in for the Battalion. The Corps Commander had discussions with Major General K. V. Krishna Rao, GOC 8 Mountain Division, and it was decided to launch 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) for the operation. As per General Rao, in spite of heavy casualties in two successful attacks at Atgram and Gazipur, "It was the best battalion in my Division. It has great pride and esprit de corps; a feeling that nothing will deter and are prepared to make any sacrifice." Based on these inputs, the first reconnaissance flight to Sylhet was carried out on the morning of 7th December at about 1000 hours, when Commander 59 Mountain Brigade Brigadier C. A. Quinn, Group Captain Chandan Singh Commander 6 TAC, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Harolikar, and Wing Commander R. S. Sandhu flew over Sylhet. No fire was drawn, reinforcing the idea that Sylhet was vacated.

With a plethora of intelligence information, confidence at higher level was that Sylhet was vacated. Two companies under a Commanding Officer took off from Kalaura and landed at Mirpara on the outskirts of Sylhet, at 3 PM on 7th December 1971. The landing was contested by Pakistani troops, heavy MMG fire and artillery shells, indicating that Sylhet was occupied and well defended. The landing troops held ground in spite of strong reaction and counter attacks. There were no further flights on 7th December and the balance of the Battalion build up happened only on the next morning (8th) and adopted wider deployment to give the impression of a larger force having landed. The media added further inputs by reporting that a brigade had been heli-landed at Sylhet.

​

Heli landing Sylhet - 7th December 1971

(Click on image to enlarge)

​

Surrender Ceremony - 16th Dec. 1971, 4 PM

(Click on image to enlarge)

























On 8th December, the forward company commander of the heliborne force (Major Kaul) switched on his radio set and picked up a clear conversation of 313 Infantry Brigade having been in Sylhet and planning a counter attack on the heli-landed force. Due to wider deployment adopted by the Battalion, the Pakistanis were under the impression that a full brigade had landed and they were trying to regain some of the area with this counter attack. To quote Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Harolikar (in the book, Bravest of the Brave): "From a wireless transmission intercepted by Major Kaul, it was clear that 313 Infantry Brigade had arrived in Sylhet on 7th December and along with 202 Infantry Brigade, were planning an attack (with five companies) on Alfa (Major Rana) and Delta (Major Kaul) Companies, which were posing a serious threat to the bridge, besides also being a road block."

​

Lt. Gen J. S. Aurora with Hav. Dil Bahadur Chettri, MVC, and Lt Col A. B. Harolikar, MVC, after the war.

(Click on image to enlarge)

The information of the radio intercept was duly passed on to the higher formations. In the Pakistani plans, Pakistani Brigade (313) was meant to defend crossings over Meghna River, Coronation Bridge and approach to Dacca. Instead this brigade withdrew to Sylhet, on orders of the GOC Pakistani 14 Infantry Division (Qazi Majid) and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had now to tackle two brigades (202 and 313). The higher thinking on receipt of this information from the Battalion can be best summed up in the words of Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, PVSM (in the book, Birth of a Nation): "On 7th December, 4/5 Gorkha Rifles of 59 Mountain Brigade had been lifted by helicopters to the South-East of Sylhet across the Surma River. The Pakistanis had evacuated the civilian population from Sylhet and fortified the town. The Pakistani 202 Infantry Brigade held the defences. Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade, ex-Maulvi Bazar, joined the Sylhet Garrison, bringing the strength up to six battalions, one regiment of 105 mm. guns and one battery of 120 mm. mortars. The move of Pakistani 313 Infantry Brigade from Maulvi Bazar to Sylhet had not been anticipated by us at Command Headquarters and came as a surprise. We had expected this brigade to fall back to Coronation Bridge on the Meghna River, for the defence of the Meghna crossing and Dacca. Had they done so, IV Corps progress across the Meghna would have been difficult. When we got the radio intercepts confirming their move to Sylhet, we were relieved. It meant for all practical purposes, that two infantry brigades were out on a limb at Sylhet, where they could be contained and their effectiveness neutralised. After the war, whilst interrogating the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Pakistani division (14), Major General Abdul Quazi (Qazi Majid), I asked him why he had moved this brigade to Sylhet. He replied that he was determined that he would not let us capture Sylhet. Niazi’s fortress strategy and the divisional commanders implementation of this policy speeded up the disintegration of Pakistani defence capabilities and facilitated the capture of Dacca."

Late Lieutenant General A.A.K Niazi narrates this move as treason (in the book, Betrayal of Pakistan): "Within the overall defensive plan of the sector, 14 Division had been entrusted with the task of defending Narsingdi-Narayanganj Sector. They were to fall back, when ordered, from Sylhet and Ashuganj. Sylhet Brigade had come down to Maulvi Bazar. Majid (GOC 14 Infantry Division) had been given the mission to fall back on Dacca after the destruction of the Bhairab Bazar Bridge. I ordered him to fall back to Narsingdi. He regretted his inability to do so. He was specially given six ferries for the move to Dacca and the railway line was also available to him - it was later used by Indians, and his troops watched the spectacle. He could easily have reached Dacca, but he never even made (an) attempt. It appears his disobedience was part of the plan to let the East Pakistan garrison face ignominy. He knew that the defence of Dacca was vital. Still he failed to obey. I, therefore, removed him from the command of his division and put his troops under the command of 36 Division." (After the war and repatriation, Major General Qazi Majid was tried by a Court Martial for treason).

​

Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh and Maj. Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao with Hav. Dil Bahadur Chettri at Sylhet

(Click on image to enlarge)

On the morning of 9th December, on receipt of information at Command Headquarters and IV Corps, it was decided, that 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) having tied down two Pakistani Brigades at Sylhet (202 and 313), all resources must be geared to establish link up with the heliborne force. It was also appreciated that the Pakistanis had no force available to defend the Meghna crossings. What was the worry was that how far 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) could continue to hold the two brigades at Sylhet and advance to Meghna river. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh had his vision now fixed on Dacca, since the Meghna river would not be defended strongly and gave an opening towards Dacca. As per the earlier plans, contact of Meghna river by IV Corps was to be made by 21 December (D + 18 - D Day being 3rd December). At this stage, the plan of the IV Corps advance only upto the Meghna River was suddenly changed to be the first to cross the Meghna and race towards Dacca. Even at this stage, the surrender of Dacca was not envisaged. To implement this revised plan to cross the Meghna river, all helicopter resources meant for 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) were diverted on the 9th for ferrying operations of 311 Infantry Brigade and 57 Mountain Division and 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) left on its own, with no link up for next 8 days. In fact, Heliborne Operations of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force), now fondly called Sylhet Gurkhas, had tied down the brigades who would have defended Meghna/Dacca and this opened the route for an unopposed crossing of the Meghna river by IV Corps troops to enable them to pose a threat to Dacca from the Eastern Thrust Line.

​

Sylhet Trophy Unveiled in 1983

(Click on image to enlarge)

The movement of IV Corps towards Dacca gained momentum and where the plans were to contact Meghna river on D + 18 (21st December), IV Corps troops reached and crossed Meghna river much earlier (14th December). On the 14th, 101 Comn Zone was placed under command of Advance Tactical Headquarters of IV Corps, in situ, at the behest of IV Corps, who were now around Meghna river. In the meantime, GOC 101 Comn Zone (Major General G. Nagra) along with his GSO 1 (Lt. Gen. Y. M. Bammi, PVSM, AVSM), and some forces (Company 2 Para, 6 Sikh LI and Mukhtis under Brigadier Sant Singh, MVC), reached Dacca on the morning of 16th at about 10 AM and established contact with General Niazi. In fact, Major General Nagra sent a small note on the scribbling pad of his GSO 1 to Niazi for an early meeting. They knew each other when Major General Nagra was Defence Attaché in Pakistan and Niazi was a brigade commander. At about 11 AM, Lieutenant General J. F. R. Jacob arrived and met Niazi and the surrender ceremony planned for the same evening. When this was happening at Dacca, Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) had been inside Sylhet town for nearly 24 hours, having had the surrender ceremony completed on 15th December at 3 PM, when IV Corps troops were nowhere close to Dacca. Then, on the morning of the 16th at 9 AM, they (Sylhet Gurkhas) took the physical charge of 3 Brigadiers, 1 Colonel, 107 officers, 219 JCOs and 6190 soldiers and 39 non-combatant Pakistanis.

An analysis of the Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gurkhas will indicate that the operation was mounted in an intelligence vacuum, in an area appreciated to be devoid of Pakistani troops. The Sylhet Gurkhas landing was opposed and not withstanding strong opposition, held ground till the two Pakistani brigades surrendered on 15th December, even before the official ceasefire. Had 313 Pakistan Infantry Brigade not moved into Sylhet, things would have been different at the theatre level. This could have been all the more different if Sylhet Gurkhas had not tied down the two brigades from the 7th to the 15th of December. Possibly, if Lieutenant General Niazi had succeeded in getting this brigade (313) to defend the Meghna river and Narsingdi, making movement of IV Corps as well as 101 Comn Zone towards Dacca difficult, the Dacca surrender may not have taken place on 16th December.

On a conservative estimate, the Heliborne Operation of Sylhet Gurkhas (4/5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)) made it possible for Indian Army and Mukhti Bahini to reach Dacca much earlier than planned; at least by 8 days. On the 16th, when the surrender ceremony was going on at Dacca, Sylhet Gurkhas were celebrating with a toast, in honour of three fold success of the Battalion:

1. First Ever Successful Heliborne Operation of Indian Army, which tied the two brigades from the 7th to the 15th of December.
2. Surrender of two Pakistani Brigades (202 and 313) on 15th December 1971.
3. First major surrender to own forces in the Eastern Theatre.

But the fourth larger toast, unknown to them at that time, was reserved for surrender at Dacca, which was thought unattainable. For 'Early Dacca Surrender' was made possible by Sylhet Gurkhas tying down the Pakistani Meghna River Brigade (313), in addition to 202 Pak Infantry Brigade at Sylhet from the 7th to the 15th.

The Battalion by now had three successful major operations to its credit: Atgram, Ghazipur and Sylhet. However, the degree of valour and contribution to the early creation of free Bangladesh, credit also goes to the men of the Sylhet Gurkhas, but not without a price. The cost of glory over the 27 days (20th November to 16th December) was not meagre. Thirty one (4 Officers, 3 Junior Commissioned Officers, 7 Non-Commissioned Officers and 17 Riflemen) sacrificed their lives. Ironically one officer (Major Puri) and one Rifleman (Rifleman Kanta Bir Thapa) were injured during the 1965 War also, but this time they sacrificed their lives. Another 122 (7 Officers, 2 Junior Commissioned Officers, 32 Non- Commissioned Officers and 81 Riflemen) were injured. A total of 153 casualties, including 11 Officers, constituted nearly 25 percent of the Battalion strength, out of which 55 were leaders at different levels (Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers); nearly 8 percent of the Battalion strength. This was the leadership and lead provided by Company, Platoon and Section Commanders. Sylhet is the Battle Honour of The Sylhet Gurkhas and East Pakistan as Theatre Honour and nobody can deny that Heliborne Operations by Sylhet Gurkhas lead to early surrender at Dacca in December 1971.



Brigadier Kaul was Assault Company Commander (D Company) during the infiltration Khukri attack at Atgram and Forward Company Commander during the Battle of Sylhet. He was seriously injured during the battle of Sylhet.

About Sylhet operations:

The Battle of Sylhet Fortress 1971 War

 

[bongbang]

Bhutto had a role in Mujib's Assassination. Pakistani agents had role in destabilizing Bangladesh in 1975. Mind changing book: Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times: Stanley Wolpert

Interesting Chapters 8,9 and 13. To understand the situation from other side in 1971. How they hoped they will get back Bangladesh within 5 to 10 years.

Page 248,256, Chapter: From people to third world leader

zulfi bhutto - search (Open Library)

@syedali73

 

[Jf Thunder]

Bhutto had a role in Mujib's Assassination. Pakistani agents had role in destabilizing Bangladesh in 1975. Mind changing book: Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times: Stanley Wolpert

Interesting Chapters 8,9 and 13. To understand the situation from other side in 1971. How they hoped they will get back Bangladesh within 5 to 10 years.

Page 248,256, Chapter: From people to third world leader

View attachment 236380

View attachment 236381


zulfi bhutto - search (Open Library)

@syedali73

wow

 

[Md Akmal]

Jai Hind of Netaji/INA during WW II.Jiye Sind of GM Syed just after Partition. BD Zindabad was first uttered by Maj Dalim while announcing the death of SM in the coup.Mushtaq,Zia, Ershad and BNP/BKZ continued this. In fact Joy Bangla is not used by anyone except BAL.Somehow people have not accepted this slogan finding Zindabad closer to the heart.

@ The "Joy Bangla", slogan was not created by Awami Leaque rather it was invented back in 1906 once Bengal was partitioned by the British.

@ The Hindus could not accept the partition of Bengal. They started agitation, cultural revolution (not like Chinese cultural revolution) and finally terrorism acts against this partition. During these days it was first heard the slogan of :"Joy Bangla" .

@ In those days whenever any terror act was successful, the people used to shout "Joy Bangla".

@ "Tura sob joyer dhono kor', "ebar tur mora gange ban utheche joy ma bole ", etc.

 

[Apprentice]

The link doesn't open. Rapes / killings were committed by PA and the locally raised irregulars.

What do you believe was the true extent of the rape? And who was more involved, the PA or razakars?

@ The "Joy Bangla", slogan was not created by Awami Leaque rather it was invented back in 1906 once Bengal was partitioned by the British.

@ The Hindus could not accept the partition of Bengal. They started agitation, cultural revolution (not like Chinese cultural revolution) and finally terrorism acts against this partition. During these days it was first heard the slogan of :"Joy Bangla" .

@ In those days whenever any terror act was successful, the people used to shout "Joy Bangla".

@ "Tura sob joyer dhono kor', "ebar tur mora gange ban utheche joy ma bole ", etc.

I love your posts. I have been reading up abt this '71 debacle for quite a bit and I have been asking Bengali friends and reading books about the role of secularists, Hindus and communists in propagating hatred between the Muslims of both wings of Pakistan.Because in Pakistani textbooks there is a great deal of blame laid on the Hindu professors in East Pakistan and I want know if the blame is historically accurate or not. How much truth and how much fiction do you believe is in that charge about Hindu professors and teachers brainwashing Muslims in East Pakistan?